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INTRODUCTION 
  
 Corporate shareholders elect their boards of directors.1  They 
do not, however, use anything like a conventional ballot.  Instead, 
shareholders fill out a “proxy ballot” delivered to them by the 
incumbent board.  This proxy ballot lists only the incumbent 
board’s chosen nominees, very often the same board members 
themselves.  If a shareholder wants to run for director or propose 
another nominee for the board, she needs to provide all other 
shareholders with a separate proxy ballot.2 
 Throughout the last decade, the Securities & Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has been at work developing a rule for 
allowing shareholders to have access to the corporate proxy ballot.3  
In 2010, the agency finally passed Rule 14a-11, which would have 
required corporations to put shareholder-nominated candidates on 
the company’s own proxy ballot (as long as certain conditions 
were met).4  The 2010 rule was the culmination of a process that 
included two previous incarnations, as well as legislation that 
specifically paved the way for the rule’s creation.5  Less than a 
year after its passage, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit struck down the law, holding that the SEC violated 
                                                
* Professor and John DeWitt Gregory Research Scholar, Hofstra Law School. 
** Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. 
1 See, e.g., DEL.	   CODE	   ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.21 
(2007). 
2 See, e.g., DEL.	  CODE	  ANN. tit. 8, § 215; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.22 (2007). 
3 For a discussion of these proposals, see Part I infra. 
4 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 
9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 
29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010).  The regulation was formerly 
codified as Rule 14a-11.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (2010), vacated by 
Business Roundtable v. S.E.C., 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  The 
Commission recognized the vacation of the rule in Facilitating Shareholder 
Director Nominations, 76 Fed. Reg. 58100 (Sept. 20, 2011). 
5 See Part I infra.   
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2115495
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the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to consider the rule’s 
costs and benefits adequately.6  According to the Court, the SEC’s 
failure was so egregious that the Commission’s decision to 
promulgate Rule 14a-11 was “arbitrary and capricious.”7 
 Other commentators have noted that the D.C. Circuit’s 
opinion rests on an extremely muscular version of judicial 
review—one that contravenes the traditional deference to 
administrative authority.8  Our concern, however, is with the 
court’s misapplication of law and economics principles.  The 
court’s reasoning in Business Roundtable rests on flawed empirical 
and theoretical conclusions about proxy access and corporate 
governance.  It ignores the benefits of facilitating shareholder 
democracy and focuses instead on costs that are routine for any 
functioning electoral system.  As a result, its decision to strike 
down the regulation rests on a version of law and economics that 
contravenes the discipline’s traditional principles and exacerbates 
agency costs.   
 Rule 14a-11 is open to debate on grounds of policy.9  But the 
Business Roundtable decision improperly sides with management 
by casting one side in the shareholder democracy debate as 
“arbitrary and capricious.”  It is, in fact, the court’s opinion that 
uses economic and voting-rights principles in a capricious manner.  
In Part I, we provide a brief overview of Rule 14a-11 and the 
Business Roundtable decision.  In Part II, we discuss the basic 
theory of voting rights and apply them to the shareholder franchise.  
In Part III, we discuss how the D.C. Circuit misconstrued the 
dynamics of shareholder voting and the role of Rule 14a-11 in the 
process.  Finally, in part IV we discuss the larger problem 
exemplified by the Business Roundtable decision—namely, the 
growing preference amongst some law and economics 
                                                
6 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d, at 1146. 
7 Id. at 1156. 
8 See, e.g., Case Comment, Administrative Law—Corporate Governance 
Regulation—D.C. Circuit Finds SEC Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and 
Capricious for Inadequate Economic Analysis: Business Roundtable v. SEC, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1088, 1093, 1095 (2012) (concluding that the court “applied 
an excessively exhausting standard that all but bars contested reforms”);  Steven 
M. Davidoff, Proxy Access in Limbo After Court Rules Against It, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK, July 27, 2011,  http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/proxy-
access-in-limbo-after-court-rules-against-it/ (noting that “the opinion appears to 
create an almost insurmountable barrier for the S.E.C. by requiring that it 
provide empirical support amounting to proof that its rules would be effective”). 
9 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 
EMORY L.J. 435, 439 (2012) (characterizing the rule as “a largely ineffective 
tool for shareholder nomination of directors”); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. 
Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1432 (2011) 
(arguing that proxy access rules, in whatever form, are not “likely to be very 
important”). 
2012] BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE 3 
commentators for a Potemkin-Village version of shareholder 
democracy, one that undermines the very market principles that 
they purport to advance. 
 
 
I.  THE HISTORY OF PROXY ACCESS, FROM 1942  
TO BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE V. SEC 
 
 The SEC’s proxy access rule was not a lark; it was not a 
quick-draw policy change that came out of the darkness.  Allowing 
shareholders direct access to the board’s proxy ballot is, in many 
ways, an intuitive step.  The proxy ballot is designed to look like 
an actual ballot—an instrument for casting one’s vote in the 
election of directors.  However, the proxy ballot is in fact simply 
an instruction to the board as to how one’s shares should be voted 
at the annual meeting.  The board decides the nominees to be 
placed on its own ballot and oversees its distribution.  It is much 
more akin to a letter or request to the board, made on a form that 
the board has provided for that purpose, as to how the 
shareholder’s shares should be voted at the meeting.10  It is not a 
ballot.  The actual election is conducted at the shareholders’ 
meeting, and the proxy ballots are used to give the board that 
shareholder’s proxy votes.  If the shareholder was personally 
appearing at the meeting, she could votes her shares in person and 
would have no need for a proxy.  For those who are absent, the 
company’s proxy ballot is a way for the incumbent board to 
facilitate votes—but on the board’s own terms.    Thus, in order to 
run against the incumbent board and/or the board’s designated 
replacements, an “insurgent” candidate must provide her own 
proxy ballots for distribution.  If the shareholder is voting with the 
board, she turns in the board’s proxy; if voting for the opposition, 
either the shareholder must show up and vote directly or she must 
provide her proxy to the opposition’s designee. 
 Because we are used to voting using a designated ballot, it is 
natural to confuse the proxy ballot with an actual one.  This 
confusion is perhaps at the heart of the proxy access debates.  Over 
time, the proxy ballot has been coopted by the government for 
various purposes. The proxy is generally accompanied by massive 
disclosures required by federal law; it includes votes over 
compensation packages and audit providers; and it provides 
shareholder access for independent referenda on questions relating 
                                                
10 For examples of proxy ballots, see SEC, Spotlight on Proxy Matters—
Receiving Proxy Materials, at: 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxymatters/proxy_materials.shtml (last visited 
April 3, 2012). 
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to a variety of potential subjects.11  The ballots are generally sent 
(via mail or the web) to an accounting or proxy firm, which 
collects and counts the proxies, much like an independent election.  
Because of these accoutrements, the proxy ballot looks a lot more 
like a part of an independent electoral process rather than a request 
to the board to vote for the board’s nominees as provided on a 
board form. 
 Less than a decade after the passage of the Securities Act of 
1933, the SEC first considered proxy access for shareholders.12  
The proposal—debated internally—provided that “stockholders be 
permitted to use the management’s proxy statement to canvass 
stockholders generally for the election of their own nominees for 
directorships, as well as for the nominees of the management.”13  
Shareholders would have only been permitted to add an additional 
nominee for each seat; thus, the company could stop adding 
nominees once they were twice the number of positions.14  The 
Commission did not formally act upon the idea.15   
 Proxy access came up for consideration again in 1977 and 
1992. In 1977, the SEC deferred on access in favor of supporting 
the work of board nominating committees; the Commission 
intended  for these committees to consider shareholder candidates 
as well.16  And in 1992, the Commission opted to expand Rule 
14a-417 to allow shareholders to include board nominees on their 
“short-slate” proxy ballots.18  This reform made it easier for 
                                                
11 For a list of the excluded subject areas for proxy proposals, see Rule 14a-8(i),  
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-18(j) (2011). 
12 SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 3347 (Dec. 18, 1942) 
[hereinafter 1942 SEC Release].   
13 See Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-19 (1943) 
(testimony of Chairman Ganson Purcell), cited in STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REP., REVIEW OF THE PROXY PROCESS 
REGARDING THE NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 3 (2003), available 
at, http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf [hereinafter 2003 SEC 
PROXY REPORT]. 
14 Id. 
15 See 1942 SEC Release, supra note 12.  
16 2003 SEC PROXY REPORT, supra note 13, at 3.  However, there were no 
formal requirements that the committees actually place dissident candidates on 
the ballot. 
17 Rule 14a-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (2011). 
18 2003 SEC PROXY REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.  A “short slate” is a group of 
dissident directors that falls short of the number of open seats.  Id.  The change 
in Rule 14a-4 allowed shareholders to single out a certain number of board 
nominees for inclusion on the shareholders’ proxy ballots, even if the nominees 
did not want to be included.  As an example, directors B1, B2, B3, B4, and B5 
are running for reelection.  If shareholders want to nominate S1 and S2 to run 
against B1 and B2, the shareholders can submit a proxy with S1, S2, B3, B4, 
and B5, in order to isolate B1 and B2, even if B3, B4, and B5 do not want to be 
on the shareholders’ proxies.  
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shareholders to seek minority representation on the board by 
targeting certain board nominees out of management’s entire 
slate.19 
 Over the past decade, however, the SEC has pursued proxy 
access in earnest.  The Commission proposed proxy access rules in 
2003 as part of a broader suite of pro-shareholder reforms.  Under 
the 2003 proposal, proxy access hinged on a “triggering event”: 
either a vote on a special Rule 14a-8 proposal subjecting the 
company to proxy access, or a thirty-five percent or more 
“withhold” vote for one of the company’s directors.20  Once 
triggered, shareholder with at least five percent of the voting 
securities, held for at least two years, would be entitled to 
nominate between one and three director candidates.21  The 
proposal received numerous comments but, in the end, was never 
acted upon.22   
 Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8 to create 
proxy access for shareholder director candidates was improperly 
                                                
19 Id.  
20 Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,789-90 
(Oct. 23, 2003).  The Rule 14a-8 proposal would have to have been submitted 
by a shareholder with at least one percent beneficial ownership for at least one 
year.  Id. at 60,790. 
21 Id. at 60,794-98.  The formula for number of nominees was as follows: 
 
As proposed, a company would be required to include one 
security holder nominee if the total number of members of the 
board of directors is eight or fewer, two security holder 
nominees if the number of members of the board of directors 
is greater than eight and less than 20 and three security holder 
nominees if the number of members of the board of directors 
is 20 or more. The proposal would have a separate standard 
for companies with classified or “staggered” boards of 
directors. Where a company has a director (or directors) 
currently serving on its board of directors who was elected as 
a security holder nominee, and the term of that director 
extends past the date of the meeting of security holders for 
which the company is soliciting proxies, the company would 
not be required to include on its proxy card more security 
holder nominees than could result in the total number of 
directors serving on the board that were elected as security 
holder nominees being greater than one if the total number of 
members of the board of directors is eight or fewer, two if the 
number of members of the board of directors is greater than 
eight and less than 20 and three if the number of members of 
the board of directors is 20 or more. 
 
Id. at 60,797-98. 
22 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1354. 
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excluded from a company’s proxy materials.23  The SEC had sided 
with the company, arguing that the proposal related to an election 
and was therefore excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(8).24  However, 
the court held that the exclusion only referred to proposals 
concerning a particular election, not those concerning procedural 
rules that apply to elections in general.25  The AFSCME decision 
led to a period of some confusion in the proxy world, as the court 
had rejected the SEC’s interpretation of its own rule.  Thus, the 
SEC either would be stuck with the Second Circuit’s decision or 
would have to change the rule. 
 The Commission, confronted with this legal fork in the road, 
essentially chose to explore both directions at once.  In 2007 it 
released for comment two alternative proposals: a “shareholder 
access” proposal and a “status quo” proposal.  Under the access 
proposal, the SEC would change Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to allow 
shareholders to submit proposals amending corporation bylaws 
that would give proxy access to shareholder nominees.26  Only 
shareholders owning greater than 5% of a company’s voting 
securities would be permitted to make proposals in the proxy 
materials affecting director nomination and election procedures.27  
The access proposal would allow such shareholders to offer 
whatever shareholder nomination procedures they desired in the 
proxy materials.28 The only substantive limitations on such 
procedures would be those imposed by state law or the company’s 
charter and bylaws.29  The status quo proposal was a codification 
of the SEC’s interpretation prior to the Second Circuit’s 
overturning.30  The effect of the status quo proposal would be to 
reverse the Second Circuit’s decision in AFSCME and continue to 
                                                
23 AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006). 
24 See id. at 123 (discussing previous version of Rule 14a-8(i)(8), which allowed 
companies to exclude a shareholder proposal under 14a-8 that “relates to an 
election”). 
25 Id. at 130. 
26 Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 27913, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466 (Aug. 3, 2007).   
27 Id. at 43,472.  In addition, to be eligible shareholders could not have acquired 
or held their securities for the purpose of or with the effect of changing or 
influencing the control of the company and also had to meet the requirements of 
Schedule 13G.  Any shareholder wishing to circumvent the rule would have to 
follow the SEC’s other disclosure requirements for hostile takeovers and similar 
actions.  Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id.  The actual form and substance of the proposed bylaw amendments by the 
shareholders would still be governed by the corporation or state law, and the 
SEC would only intervene regarding the procedures of proposing such a bylaw 
and the disclosure requirements. 
30 Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act 
Release No. 56,161, Investment Company Act Release No. 27914, 72 Fed. Reg. 
43488 (Aug. 3, 2007).  
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permit corporations to exclude from proxy materials shareholder 
proposals that would affect the director nomination and election 
procedures.31  Ultimately, the SEC adopted the status quo proposal 
in a divided 3-2 vote.32 
 In 2009, the SEC released yet another iteration of proxy 
access.  This version created a new rule—Rule14a-11—that would 
provide for direct access to the ballot for shareholders.33  The 2009 
proposal significantly reduced the requirements for participation.  
Only 1% ownership was necessary for companies with over $700 
million in assets, sliding up to 3% for those with assets between 
$75 million and $700 million, and 5% for those under $75 
million.34  The period for holding the securities was only one year, 
and a triggering event was no longer necessary.35  Most 
significantly, the proposal would have made this access a 
mandatory part of the corporate structure, rather than merely 
allowing shareholders to implement it on their own.   
 The SEC received comments on the proposal up through 2010, 
when the Dodd-Frank Act specifically gave the Commission the 
authority to enact proxy access reforms.36  Soon thereafter, the 
Commission adopted Rule 14a-11 on a 3-2 vote.37  The final rule 
increased the ownership requirements to 3% but allowed 
shareholders to pool their holdings to reach that threshold. That 3% 
had to be held for three years prior to the nominations and up 
through the actual shareholder meeting.  Shareholders were limited 
to nominating candidates for up to 25% of the seats on the board, 
and they could not intend a change in control.38  In addition, the 
Commission amended Rule 14a-8 to allow shareholders to propose 
proxy nomination processes within their individual corporations.39 
                                                
31 Id. at 43,493. 
32 Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1355. 
33 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 
9,046, Exchange Act Release No. 60,089, Investment Company Act Release No. 
28,765, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (June 18, 2009).  
34 Id. at 29,035. 
35 Id. at 29,032, 29,035. 
36 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 971(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (“The 
Commission may issue rules permitting the use by a shareholder of proxy 
solicitation materials supplied by an issuer of securities for the purpose of 
nominating individuals to membership on the board of directors of the issuer, 
under such terms and conditions as the Commission determines are in the 
interests of shareholders and for the protection of investors.”). 
37 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 
9,136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 
29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
38 Id.  
39 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2012).  The revised Rule 14a-8 only excludes 
proposals that “(i) Would disqualify a nominee who is standing for election; (ii) 
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 A little over a month after the rule was adopted, the Business 
Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce filed a petition with the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit seeking an injunction 
against the new rule.40  The SEC stayed the rule pending judicial 
review.41  On July 22, 2011, the D.C. Circuit struck down the 
regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act42 for failing 
“adequately to consider the new rule’s effect upon efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation.”43   
 The court based its ruling on three failures on the part of the 
Commission.  First, the court found that the SEC failed to calculate 
the costs and the benefits of the new rule properly, specifically 
with respect to the incumbent board’s costs of opposing a 
shareholder nominee.  According to the court, “the Commission 
failed to appreciate the intensity with which issuers would oppose 
nominees and arbitrarily dismissed the probability that directors 
would conclude their fiduciary duties required them to support 
their own nominees.”44  The court also criticized the Commission’s 
“mixed empirical evidence” on the benefits of proxy access, and 
claimed that the agency had misapplied state law as an excuse for 
ignoring certain costs.45  The second failure was the SEC’s neglect 
of the strategic uses of the rule for union and state pension fund 
shareholders.  The court found “there was good reason to believe 
institutional investors with special interests will be able to use the 
rule” to advance their “self-interested objectives rather than the 
goal of maximizing shareholder value.”46  Finally, as to the third 
failure, the court accused the Commission of emphasizing the 
infrequency of elections when assessing the costs, but not when 
                                                                                                         
Would remove a director from office before his or her term expired; (iii) 
Questions the competence, business judgment, or character of one or more 
nominees or directors;  (iv) Seeks to include a specific individual in the 
company's proxy materials for election to the board of directors; or (v) 
Otherwise could affect the outcome of the upcoming election of directors.”  Id. 
40 Petition for Review, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 2010 WL 3770710, at *2 (D.C. 
Cir.). 
41 See Order Granting Stay In re Motion of Bus. Roundtable, Securities Act 
Release No. 9,149, Exchange Act Release No. 63,031, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 29,456 (Oct. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/33-9149.pdf. 
42 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2006). 
43 Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1146.  See also id. at 1148 (“The petitioners 
argue the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously here because it 
neglected its statutory responsibility to determine the likely economic 
consequences of Rule 14a–11 and to connect those consequences to efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation. . . . We agree with the petitioners and hold 
the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously for having failed once again . 
. . adequately to assess the economic effects of a new rule.”). 
44 Id. at 1149. 
45 Id. at 1151. 
46 Id. at 1152. 
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assessing the benefits.  According to the court, “the Commission's 
discussion of the estimated frequency of nominations under Rule 
14a–11 is internally inconsistent and therefore arbitrary.”47 
 The D.C. Circuit’s decision striking down Rule 14a-11 
surprised many observers, including opponents of the rule.48  In 
fact, it seems fair to say that most academic commentators were 
quite critical of the opinion.49  Much of the commentary focused 
on the level of review called for under the statute—“arbitrary and 
capricious”—when compared with the regulation’s actual flaws as 
found by the court.  This article, however, is not about the 
application of the Administrative Procedure Act to the SEC’s 
proxy access regulation.  Instead, it concerns the court’s economic 
and voting-rights analysis supporting its decision to strike the 
regulation down.  Before turning to that critique, we provide a 
brief overview of shareholder democracy, in theory and practice. 
 
 
 II.  SHAREHOLDERS, DEMOCRACY, AND CORPORATE LAW 
 
                                                
47 Id. at 1153. 
48 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Proxy Access Invalidated on APA Grounds, 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM, (July 22, 2011), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/07/proxy-
access-invalidated-on-apa-grounds.html (“Candidly, while I’m pleased, I’m also 
surprised.  I had thought—and said publicly—that I thought this suit was a long 
shot.”). 
49 Case Comment, supra note 8 (saying that the opinion “made missteps similar 
to those for which [it] scolded the SEC,” and called it “troubling”); Davidoff, 
supra note 8 (noting that “the opinion appears to create an almost 
insurmountable barrier for the S.E.C. by requiring that it provide empirical 
support amounting to proof that its rules would be effective”); Brett McDonnell, 
Dodd-Frank @1: An Overall Assessment, THE CONGLOMERATE BLOG, (July 22, 
2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/07/dodd-frank-1-an-overall-
assessment.html  (“This opinion is little more than the judges ignoring the 
proper judicial rule of deference to an agency involved in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking and asserting their own naked political preferences. Talk about 
judicial activism.”); Gordon Smith, Comment to Gordon Smith, Business 
Roundtable v. SEC, THE CONGLOMERATE BLOG, (July 22, 2011),  
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/07/business-roundtable-v-
sec.html#comment-261374058 (“I had told my students that I thought the 
lawsuit was not well-founded, so I was surprised by the opinion. I understand 
why people would oppose proxy access, but ‘arbitrary and capricious’? The 
process hardly seems to qualify for that characterization. . . . I am not enamored 
with the result here.”); David Zaring, More on the DC Circuit’s Proxy Access 
Decision, THE CONGLOMERATE BLOG, (Aug. 4, 2011),  
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/08/the-dc-circuits-proxy-access-decision-
keeps-getting-attention-see-here-for-a-roundup-and-here-from-elliott-spitzer-
seem.html (saying that the court’s analysis is “probably best characterized as 
fly-specking, and the kind of searching inquiry no agency could survive,” and 
that “the opinion isn’t very good”). 
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All institutions, including business corporations, must make 
decisions.  These decisions often involve judgments about the 
needs and desires of a wide variety of constituents.  There are 
many ways to move from these individual preferences to 
institutional choices.  And most of the institutions that comprise 
modern market economies—from governments to small 
businesses—employ a range of decisionmaking structures designed 
to take account of their constituents’ preferences.  They sometimes 
rely upon contracts, which are thought to ensure the preference 
satisfaction of everyone involved.50  But once institutions reach a 
certain size and complexity, contracts alone can’t do the job.  At 
that point, the institutions resort to some sort of voting mechanism 
to translate individual preferences into institutional choices. 
 
A.  Governments 
   
Democratic political institutions, of course, rely heavily on 
voting mechanisms to translate preferences into social choices; 
indeed, the ability of its constituents to cast a meaningful vote is 
what makes a government “democratic.”  But when political 
institutions settle on voting as the preferred method of preference 
aggregation, they still have many decisions to make about how to 
structure the process.  Those decisions often come to be embodied 
in a set of legal entitlements, or voting rights, which collectively 
sketch the contours of polity. Voting rights, though, are not 
unidimensional; instead, there are many distinct facets to the rights 
to vote, each of which is necessary to ensuring full democratic 
participation.51 
The first aspect of the right involves access—the ability to 
cast a ballot.52  This is voting rights at its most fundamental.  At 
                                                
50 See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, The Cult of Efficiency in 
Corporate Law, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 239, 244-45 (2010). 
51Pam Karlan sets up a taxonomy of three aspects of the right to vote in Pamela 
S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in 
Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 176 (1989).  
See also Grant M. Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation, 
92 CALIF. L. REV. 1589, 1594-1602 (2004) [hereinafter Dilemma] (giving a brief 
account of the history of each aspect of the right).  Other ways of parsing out the 
right to vote, see, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, What Kind of Right is “The Right to 
Vote”?, 93 VA. L. REV. 43 (2007); Pamela S.Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some 
Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709-20 (1993), are not 
inconsistent with this conception.  Here, we take Karlan’s taxonomy as a starting 
point and add the slating process into the mix.   
52 For a relatively recent history of the right to vote, see ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, 
THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2000).  For information about voting in the early years of the republic, 
see MARCHETTE G. CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO 
VOTE IN AMERICA, 1619-1850 (1969); CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN 
SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860 (1960).  For 
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the beginning of the country’s history, most states only extended 
the franchise to property-holding white men over the age of 
twenty-one.53  That, of course, has changed, and many more 
groups have access to the ballot.54  There are, however, some 
restrictions that remain: most jurisdictions restrict voting by felons 
or ex-felons,55 noncitizens,56 and nonresidents.57  Minors and 
people with certain mental impairments are also not allowed to 
vote.58  But, although we are far from universal suffrage, a greater 
proportion of the population can vote now than could at the 
country’s founding. 
In a sense, the question of “who” should have a right to vote 
is relatively straightforward.  The debate is essentially over which 
groups should be considered members of the polity whose 
                                                                                                         
information about voting rights in more recent years, with an emphasis on the 
quest for minority representation, see QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE 
IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard 
Grofman eds. 1994); BERNARD GROFMAN, LISA HANDLEY & RICHARD NIEMI, 
MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY (1992); 
STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-
1969 (1976); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: 
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 
1880-1910 (1974). 
53 See KEYSSAR, supra note 52, at tbls. 1-3, for a list of the property and 
taxpaying requirements in the colonies and states between 1776 and 1855. 
54 African Americans and other racial minorities initially secured voting rights 
through a series of constitutional amendments.  See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII 
(abolishing slavery), XIV (granting national citizenship and rights of due 
process and equal protection) & XV (prohibiting voting rights discrimination on 
the basis of race).  For a discussion of passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, see 
WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE 
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1965); KEYSSAR, supra note 52, at 93-104.  Those 
protections were lost as a result of Sothern resistance and Northern indifference, 
see KEYSSAR, supra note 52, at 107, 111-16; KOUSSER, supra note 51,; 
GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 5-10; Hayden, supra note 51, at 1595, but 
largely restored with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1971-1973bb-1 (2000); see GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 52; LAWSON, supra 
note 51, at 10.  On passage of the Voting Rights Act, see LAWSON, supra note 
52, at 288-328; KEYSSAR, supra note 52, at 262-64. Women secured access to 
the polls in 1920 through the Nineteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, 
and eighteen- to twenty-year olds through the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. U.S. 
CONST. amend. XXVI. 
55 See Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, 
and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2004). 
56 See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, 
Constitutional, and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
1391, 1397-1418, 1460-67 (1993). 
57 See Glenn P. Smith, Note, Interest Exceptions to One-Resident, One-Vote: 
Better Results from the Voting Rights Act? 74 TEXAS L. REV. 1153, 1159 (1996) 
(explaining that, in the 1960s, residency became “the sole proxy for electoral 
interest.  Residency – and, in most cases, residency alone – became the standard 
for granting suffrage to qualified potential voters.”).   
58 See KEYSSAR, supra note 52, at 287-88. 
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preferences should be reflected in electoral outcomes.  The issue 
becomes more complicated once we move from “who” votes to 
“how” they vote.  It does so because the mechanics of most 
election procedures—things like registration requirements, voting 
methods, and vote counting—may themselves restrict the right to 
vote, but in more subtle ways that depend upon whether the 
procedures have disproportionate effect on some voter-relevant 
group.59  For example, if a state requires voters to produce 
photographic identification in order to vote, and large numbers of, 
say, poor people lack such identification, then that may skew the 
outcome of the election.60  In a sense, then, both who has a right to 
vote and how they vote, can affect access to the electoral system. 
Mere access to the polls, though, guarantees very little, 
especially in a representative democracy.61  To begin with, votes 
may end up carrying different numerical weights.62  Sometimes, as 
in weighted voting systems, this is part of the design.  The 
International Monetary Fund, for example, assigns different 
numbers of votes to each member country.63  In other cases, votes 
are weighted differently as a result of deliberate indifference to 
underlying demographic changes.  In the first half of the twentieth 
century, many states refused to redraw district lines in the face of 
                                                
59 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (noting that “[e]ach 
provision of these [state election codes], whether it governs the registration and 
qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting 
process itself, inevitably affects -- at least to some degree -- the individual's right 
to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends”); Christopher S. 
Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations 
and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313 (2007) (explaining the sliding scale 
of scrutiny applied to election codes). 
60 See, e.g., Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1365-66 
(N.D. Ga. 2005). 
61 See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the 
False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 451 
(2008) [hereinafter False Promise]. 
62 For background on this aspect of the right to vote, see STEPHEN 
ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE 
PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2008); 
ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN 
LAW AND POLITICS (1968); REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION: 
LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Robert A. Goldwin 
ed., 1968); GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: 
REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); 
ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL 
REPRESENTATION (1965); Hayden, Dilemma, supra note 50; Grant M. Hayden, 
The False Promise of One Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV. 213 (2003) 
[hereinafter One Person]. 
63 See Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF 
Board of Governors, (Mar. 15, 2012), at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm. 
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tremendous demographic changes.64  This had the effect of diluting 
the numerical voting power of those in more populous (largely 
urban) districts and concentrating it in the less populous (rural) 
districts,65 a situation remedied by the Supreme Court’s one 
person, one vote decisions in the 1960s.66  The ability to cast a 
meaningful vote, though, can clearly be inhibited by either denying 
access to the polls or by numerically diluting one’s vote. 
Democratic political entities take many factors into 
consideration when making decisions about voting access and 
weight.  Chief among these, though, is some assessment of a 
voter’s interest in the political entity—what they have at stake in 
the outcome of the election.67 Those with a strong interest in the 
outcome are prime candidates for the franchise; those with little or 
nothing riding on it are rarely extended voting rights.  Given that 
voting mechanisms are primarily a method of aggregating 
individual preferences, it makes some sense to start with those who 
actually have strong feelings on the matters at issue.68  They may 
also make better informed decisions and help ensure that the 
election outcome is viewed as legitimate.69 
Because political entities have no way of directly measuring 
the strength of one’s preferences, they usually rely upon proxies 
for voter interest.70  In the past, states relied upon property-holding 
and taxpaying requirements to ensure that those voting had a 
sufficient economic stake in the outcome of an election.71  While 
such restrictions now strike us as antiquated, and even 
discriminatory, we nonetheless still believe in the underlying 
assumption that voting should be tied to interest.  We just think we 
have better proxies.  Residency requirements, for example, allow 
us to target people living within the borders of a government 
whose power is, to a great degree, geographically circumscribed: 
those people within the borders are those with a greater stake in the 
outcome of elections.72  And this connection between voter access 
and voter interest has even been endorsed by the Supreme Court.73 
                                                
64 See Hayden, One Person, supra note 62, at 219. 
65 See id. 
66 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 
(1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
(1962). 
67 See Hayden & Bodie, False Promise, supra note 61, at 452-60. 
68 See id. at 453. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. at 460-62. 
71 See id. at 454, 460. 
72 See id. at 454-55, 460. 
73 See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69 (1978); Kramer v. 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 & n.15 (1969); Hayden & Bodie, 
False Promise, supra note 61, at 455-56. 
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Political entities also attend to voter interest when assigning 
weights to votes.  In weighted voting systems, the weight is often 
assigned in proportion to the voter’s perceived stake in the 
enterprise.  In the IMF, a member’s voting power is largely 
determined by the resources it contributes to the fund.74  Other 
types of voting systems follow suite, though sometimes in ways 
that aren’t as obvious.  Take, for example, the one person, one vote 
requirement.   The U.S. Constitution requires that districting for 
the House of Representatives, both houses of state legislatures, and 
local governmental entities be done in a way that assigns equal 
numerical weight to votes.75  The requirement may involve a 
positive judgment that all are equally interested in the outcome of 
an election; more likely, it reflects our inability to make such finely 
tuned assessments of the strength of people’s preferences.76  In any 
case, though, an exception to the one person, one vote 
requirements—special purpose districts--may help prove the 
relationship between voter interest and voting weight.  The 
governing boards of special purpose districts are allowed to restrict 
the franchise to those most affected by its decisions and then 
further fine-tune voting weight with that interest.77  Water boards, 
for example, are allowed to restrict voting to landowners and, 
further, weight the votes according to how much land each voter 
owns.78  This one acre, one vote system is thought to more 
accurately tailor voter interest with voting weight. 
The ability to cast an equally weighted vote, however, does 
not guarantee an equal opportunity to participate.  There are a 
variety of other ways to keep like-minded voters from electing 
candidates of their choice.  Some of these manipulate the ways in 
which votes are combined.  At-large elections, anti-single-shot 
laws, and gerrymanders have all been used to dilute the voting 
power of certain groups.79  Gerrymandering district boundaries, for 
example, can take groups that could constitute an effective 
majority in one district and split them into two districts so they’re a 
majority in neither.80  The legal status of attempts to dilute a 
                                                
74 See Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 63. 
75 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (House of Representatives); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (state legislatures); Avery v. Midland 
County, 390 U.S. 474, 479-81 (1968) (local governments).  
76 See Hayden, One Person, supra note 62, at 251-52. 
77 See id. at 252-55. 
78 See, e.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 
719 (1973) (water district not subject to usual one person, one vote 
requirements); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (same).  
79 See BERNARD GROFMAN, LISA HANDLEY & RICHARD NIEMI, MINORITY 
REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 23-24 (1992). 
80 See Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative 
Reapportionment, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 85, 86-99 (Chandler Davidson 
ed., 1984).  These strategies of “cracking” and “packing” voters are discussed in 
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group’s voting power depends upon the type of group being 
targeted.  Racial minorities are afforded greater legal protection 
than, say, members of a political party.81   
The other way to keep groups from electing their preferred 
candidates is to interfere with the slating process.  This may be 
done from the top down, by, say, prohibiting certain candidates 
from running for or holding office.  In the aftermath of the Civil 
War, the federal government forced states to allow blacks to vote; 
the state of Georgia immediately responded by passing a law that 
prohibited blacks from holding office.82  One may also interfere 
with group voting power from the bottom up, by limiting group 
members’ access to earlier stages of the slating process.  In the first 
half of the twentieth century, southern states used the white 
primary as a means of keeping black voters out of the primary 
elections, eliminating their preferred candidates at that stage, and 
then leaving them to choose between unpalatable alternatives in 
the general election.83  The group in control of the slating process 
can effectively control electoral outcomes.84  
In the United States, the slating processes for federal, state, 
and local offices, as well as those for state initiatives, are largely 
controlled by the states.  And, in addition to the historical attempts 
to control black voting rights, states have used a variety of 
techniques to limit ballot access.  Most states have relied upon 
filing fees and signature requirements, or some combination of the 
two, to qualify for placement on the ballot.85  The filing fees 
typically vary by office, are sometimes based upon some 
percentage of the yearly salary for that office, and may sometimes 
be waived, in whole or in part, with the submission of a certain 
number of signatures.86  The signature requirements may be stated 
either in absolute terms or calculated as a percentage of the voter 
                                                                                                         
several Supreme Court opinions as well.  See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 
U.S. 30, 46 n.11 (1986). 
81 Compare Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny 
when race is the predominant factor in districting) with Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 
U.S. 267 (2004) (refusing to adjudicate a political gerrymandering claim). 
82 See KEYSSAR, supra note 52, at 86.  
83 See generally DARLENE CLARK HINE, BLACK VICTORY: THE RISE AND FALL 
OF THE WHITE PRIMARY IN TEXAS (2003). 
84 This is also true for the less obvious reason that a group with agenda control 
can take advantage of potential voting cycles and manipulate an agenda in a way 
that favors its desired outcome.  See Grant M. Hayden, Some Implications of 
Arrow’s Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV. 295, 312-313 (1995). 
85 See Mark R. Brown, Popularizing Ballot Access: The Front Door to Election 
Reform, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1281, 1284-85 (1997). 
86 See, e.g., Signature Requirements and Deadlines for 2012 State Legislative 
Elections, BALLOT*PEDIA (March 15, 2012), 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Signature_requirements_and_deadlines_fo
r_2012_state_legislative_elections.  
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turnout in some recent election, usually a gubernatorial election.87  
The barriers to entry are often designed in a way to be particularly 
onerous for minority party and independent candidates.88 
Ballot access restrictions are typically justified on two main 
grounds.  First by limiting the number of candidates or alternatives 
on the ballot, the restrictions are thought to prevent voter 
confusion.89  Second, ballot access laws are believed to promote 
electoral stability by keeping frivolous candidates off the ballot or, 
more to the point, preserving the two-party system.90  Other goals 
include more tangential benefits, such as the government’s interest 
in the revenue raised through filing fees.91 
Restricting ballot access, however, comes at a real 
democratic cost.  As discussed above, elections are first and 
foremost about preference aggregation.  People’s preferences about 
all sorts of things—from food to books to political candidates—
range widely, and any respectable system of preference 
aggregation needs to account for that variation.  (For that very 
reason, one of the principles of democratic fairness in Arrow’s 
Theorem is universal admissibility, which demands that a social 
choice mechanism needs to be able to work with any possible 
preference profile.)92  People’s preferences won’t be meaningfully 
reflected in electoral outcomes if too many options are taken off 
the table before voting even begins.  To put it in more market-
oriented terms—ballot access laws are government regulations that 
stifle electoral competition. 
For these reasons, the Supreme Court has analyzed ballot 
access as an integral component of the right to vote.  In order to be 
more than a procedural formality, the right to vote effectively must 
be understood as the right to vote for a candidate of one’s own 
choosing.93  This initially led the Court to view all ballot access 
laws with great suspicion, subjecting them to strict scrutiny, which 
required the state to justify any restriction as a necessary means to 
a compelling governmental end.94  The Court devised and applied 
that standard in the 1968 decision Williams v. Rhodes, striking 
down an Ohio requirement that new party candidates had to submit 
over 400,000 signatures by February of an election year.95   
                                                
87 See id. 
88 See Oliver Hall, Death by a Thousand Signatures: The Rise of Restrictive 
Ballot Access Laws and the Decline of Electoral Competition in the United 
States, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 407, 421-24 (2005). 
89 See id. at 420-21. 
90 See id. at 420-24. 
91 See Brown, supra note 85, at 1307. 
92 See Hayden, supra note 84, at 298. 
93 See Hall, supra note 88, at 425. 
94 See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968). 
95 See id. at 28-30; see also Hall, supra note 88, at 424-48. 
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Since Williams, however, the Court has been less critical of 
ballot access laws because, upon reflection, it turns out that the 
mechanics of most state election procedures—including ballot 
access and other things such as registration requirements, voting 
methods, and vote counting—may, in some sense, restrict the right 
to vote.  And subjecting every one of these state requirements to 
strict scrutiny seemed excessive.  The Supreme Court avoided such 
a result by fashioning a new method of analyzing constitutional 
challenges to the mechanics of registration and voting.  In Burdick 
v. Takushi, the Court established a sliding scale where the degree 
of judicial scrutiny given to a state requirement depends upon the 
“character and magnitude” of its burden on voting rights.96  Where 
the voting rights are subject to “severe” restrictions, something 
akin to ordinary strict scrutiny is applied where the regulation must 
be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling 
importance.”97  But in cases where the regulation imposes only 
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon voting rights, 
“‘the State’s important regulatory interest are generally sufficient 
to justify’ the restrictions.”98  Thus, the unidimensional application 
of strict scrutiny is moderated in recognition of the fact that all 
election regulations have some effect on the right to vote.   
Ballot access laws, then, are supposed to strike an appropriate 
balance between maintaining electoral stability and preserving 
meaningful choice.  In effect, however, the move away from strict 
scrutiny has given states quite a bit of leeway when it comes to 
restricting access to the ballot.  Minor party and independent 
candidates oftentimes have a difficult time making it onto the 
ballots, diminishing the range of options available to voters, and 
leading some scholars to argue that ballot access laws are the most 
anti-competitive feature of the American political system.99 
 
* * * 
 
 Democratic political entities, then, devise voting systems 
designed to produce group decisions that accurately reflect the 
underlying individual preferences.  They begin by indentifying 
people with an interest in the polity and ensuring that they have 
equal access to the voting system.  Those votes are weighted 
equally unless there’s some strong reason to suspect that people’s 
levels of interest are unequal in a way that can be accurately 
measured (as with special purpose districts).  Once these individual 
voting rights are secure, care must be taken to ensure that groups 
                                                
96 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 See Hall, supra note 88, at 413-16. 
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of like-minded individuals have an equal opportunity to elect 
candidates of their choice, something that can be frustrated in a 
variety of ways in either the slating process or the vote aggregation 
process.  In the end, a democratic political system is designed 
translate individual preferences into group choices without 
skewing the result in any particular direction.   
 
B.  Corporations 
 
  While business corporations are very different from political 
entities, they too confront the issue of translating individual 
preferences into group choices.100  When we think of a corporation, 
we generally picture a collection of people and assets with some 
common commercial goal.  In a legal sense, though, a corporation 
is a fiction—an entity created by the government with no 
independent existence.  Thus, perhaps it’s more useful to conceive 
of a corporation as a legal structure designed to allocate rights and 
duties among a group of people devoted to some shared 
enterprise.101  The group itself is a rather diverse set of 
constituents, and may be said to include the many types of people 
with an interest in the enterprise, including directors, officers, 
shareholders, employees, bondholders, suppliers, and even 
customers.    
 While there are a number of features considered essential to 
the legal structure of a corporation,102 the keys to its 
decisionmaking structure (and thus this paper) are shared 
ownership by investors and delegated management.103  The three 
players within this governance structure are the shareholders, the 
board of directors, and the officers.104  The shareholders, 
sometimes called the “owners” of the firm, have the right to 
receive residual profits as well as the right to elect the board of 
                                                
100 Hayden & Bodie, False Promise, supra note 61, at 460. 
101 Corporations are not, of course, the only form of business organization—
there are sole proprietorships, partnerships, trusts, and an assortment of 
variations of them.  Corporations, though, are generally viewed as the most 
complex business entitity, and the one that currently dominates the economic 
activity in the United States. 
102 Scholars have isolated five factors which are considered essential to the 
corporate form: (1) full legal personality, including the ability to bind the firm to 
contracts; (2) limited liability for owners and managers; (3) shared ownership by 
investors of capital; (4) delegated management under a board structure; and (5) 
transferable shares.  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History 
for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439-440 (2001).  Cf. ROBERT C. CLARK, 
CORPORATE LAW 2 (1986) (listing four characteristics of the corporation: (1) 
limited liability, (2) free transferability of investor interests, (3) legal 
personality, and (4) centralized management). 
103 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 102, at 440. 
104 CLARK, supra note 102, at 93. 
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directors.105  The directors are, in turn, the locus of authority within 
the corporation; they are the representatives of the firm when 
human counterparts to the fictional form are required.106  The 
board of directors, though, does not generally run the business; 
directors usually delegate this power to the officers of the 
corporation.  These officers in turn select the remaining 
employees.  The structure is hierarchical, in that shareholders can 
vote out directors, directors can fire the officers, and officers can 
fire the remaining employees.107 
 When looking at this structure in the context of political 
institutions, we are immediately struck by the fact that it is only 
shareholders who are having their preferences aggregated.  The 
corporation encompasses the daily activities of a variety of 
different players: directors, officers, executives, management, and 
employees.  Moreover, there are a variety of outside 
“stakeholders” who have interests in the activities of the 
corporation, akin to shareholders: bondholders, suppliers, 
customers, even the community at large.  However, when it comes 
to aggregating the preferences of the polity, in order to determine 
the leadership of the corporation, only shareholders are invited to 
participate.   
 This structure looks like it runs against the basic prescription 
in politics that all those with an interest in the enterprise should be 
accorded voting rights.  But the way corporations are structured is 
thought to aggregate the preferences of all of all constituents in the 
most efficient manner.  Most corporate constituents, inside and 
outside the corporation, have their preferences captured through 
contracts that fix their entitlements.108  Employees, for example, 
receive a certain wage for their labor; consumers buy the 
company’s products at a certain price.  These contracts are thought 
to be the most straightforward way to capture the preferences since 
all parties consenting to a contract prefer the state of affairs under 
the contract.109  Thus, each contract is posited to be a Pareto 
improvement.110 Shareholders have their entitlements fixed by 
contract too, but among their entitlements is the right to elect the 
board of directors (and, ultimately, control the firm).111 
                                                
105 This designation is something of a misnomer.  See text accompanying notes 
116 & 117 supra. 
106 CLARK, supra note 102, at 21. 
107 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 555-58 (2003) (discussing the 
hierarchical nature of corporate structure). 
108 Id. at 553. 
109 Id. at 583. 
110 Id. at 583-84. 
111 Id. at 548. 
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   The primary justification for limiting voting rights to 
shareholders is the theory of shareholder primacy.112  Shareholder 
primacy is the theoretical driver not only for the vote, but also for 
such key concepts as the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.113 
Shareholder primacy essentially means that corporations exist to 
serve the interests of shareholders.114  Put more specifically, the 
theory mandates that the corporation be run with the goal of 
maximizing shareholder wealth. 
  Shareholder primacy could simply be a democratic legitimacy 
argument: the corporation has to keep shareholder interests at the 
forefront, because shareholders are the voting polity.  But this 
leaves a critical question unanswered: who made the shareholders 
the voting polity?  The choice of this group as the voting “citizens” 
of the polity is what needs justifying.115  A variant of this 
justification is that shareholders are the corporation’s “owners” and 
thus were entitled to the ownership rights of profits and control.116  
However, the ownership justification is also doomed by its 
circularity: who made the shareholders the “owners”?117  Labeling 
shareholders “owners” is no more of a justification for the vote 
than is labeling them “voters”. 
 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel provided a justification 
for shareholder primacy beyond simple labels.  In looking to 
ground shareholder primacy in economic theory, they looked to the 
traditional economic utility rationale of creating the highest level 
of efficiency or overall social utility.118  Shareholder primacy 
theory argues that maximizing shareholder wealth will generate the 
highest amount of surplus and thus will result in the greatest 
overall social utility.119  Instead of being the “owners” of the 
corporation, shareholders were one group of many whose contracts 
with one another jointly created the fictional corporate “entity.”120 
However, shareholders were the sole “residual claimants:” that is, 
their returns were not payable until the other contractual 
                                                
112 See id. at 569-71. 
113 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW 90-93 (1996). 
114 See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 
277 (1998) (“The structure of corporate law ensures that corporations generally 
operate in the interests of shareholders.”). 
115 Id. at 278-79. 
116 The classic example of this perspective is Milton Friedman, The Social 
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG . 32-33, 
122-26, (Sept. 13, 1970), . 
117 See, e.g., Lynn Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder 
Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190-92 (2002) (“[T]he claim that 
shareholders own the public corporation simply is empirically incorrect.”). 
118 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 113, at 35-39. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 36. 
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participants—creditors, employees, customers, suppliers—had 
been fully satisfied.121  Because shareholders are not paid until 
these set contractual payments have been made, all other claimants 
received their contractual entitlements, and the shareholders 
benefited from the maximization of the residual. 
 Control of corporate decisionmaking is, ultimately, 
concentrated in the hands of the shareholders in order to maximize 
the preference satisfaction of all involved.  Shareholders, as the 
residual claimants, are assigned what is left after all fixed claims 
on corporate proceeds have been paid.122  Managers and directors 
are assigned, by contract or statute, a fiduciary duty to shareholders 
in order to make the residual attractive.123  And other parties can be 
offered enough to keep them involved in the corporate 
enterprise.124  Total proceeds are supposed to be higher if the 
residual claims are assigned to one group.125   Shareholders get the 
nod over other stakeholders in lieu of contractual claims because 
that is the best way to induce them to put their money at risk while 
also relinquishing any real control over how it is used.126   Again, 
the result is a combination of managerial control (as expressed by 
the business judgment rule) and shareholder interest (expressed by 
charging the managers with maximizing shareholder wealth) that is 
supposed to be a Pareto improvement over both direct shareholder 
control and a system that tries to look out for all stakeholder 
interests.127  
 This is why the “one share, one vote” rule is a “logical 
consequence” of the theory of shareholder primacy.128  The “one 
share, one vote” rule requires that each share of stock have equal 
voting weight with all other shares.  In this way, the voting interest 
is equal to the interest in the residual.  Shares with disproportionate 
voting power create skewed incentives.  As Easterbrook and 
Fischel argue, “Those with disproportionate voting power will not 
receive shares of the residual gains or loss from new endeavors and 
                                                
121 Id. at 36-37. This perspective assumes that all other claimants have rigidly-
set contractual entitlements, such that paying them more would be akin to a gift. 
122 Id. at 67-70. 
123 Id. at 90-93. 
124 Id. at 22-25. 
125 Id. at 35-39. 
126 Id. at 67-70. 
127 Id. at 35-39.  See also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
FIN. ECON. 305, 306-07 (1976) (arguing for shareholder primacy); Alan J. 
Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 
43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1629, 1671 (2002) (defending the exclusive 
shareholder franchise). 
128 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 113, at 73 (“Votes follow the residual 
cost of the firm, and unless each element of the residual interest carries an equal 
voting right, there will be needless agency cost of management.”) 
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arrangements commensurate with their control; as a result, they 
will not make optimal decisions.”129  As a result, those with control 
will have the incentive to seek disproportionate gains that do not 
directly inure to the owners of the residual.130  The residual will no 
longer be maximized, discouraging equity investment and leading 
to a decline in societal efficiency. 
 Thus, the theory of shareholder primacy rests on the notion 
that shareholders will improve social welfare by focusing on 
increasing the corporation’s residual profits.  Shareholder primacy 
is enforced through shareholder voting and by the market for 
corporate control which uses the shareholder vote to effectuate 
changes in management.  Essential to the theory is the notion of 
shareholder homogeneity: namely, that shareholders all have a 
common, homogeneous interest in increasing residual profits. 
 Over the last several years, however, it has become clear that 
shareholders are not, in fact, the homogeneous wealth maximizers 
they were once thought to be.  Instead, their interests diverge along 
a number of dimensions.131  Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy have 
recently focused attention upon the problems caused by equity 
derivatives, which carve up various shareholder rights into discrete 
financial securities.132  But there are many other ways in which 
shareholders fail to share common interests.  For example, some 
shareholders may be in a control group, and others may not.133  
Employee and pension-holding shareholders have different 
interests from non-employee shareholders.134  Traditional 
shareholders may have different time horizons for wealth 
maximization that cannot be costlessly equalized through existing 
financial instruments.135  And even when shareholder interests line 
up and they agree on a definition of wealth maximization, they 
                                                
129Id.  See also Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of 
Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1945-46 (1996) (“The case for the 
one share, one vote rule turns primarily on its ability to match economic 
incentives with voting power and to preserve the market for corporate control as 
a check on bad management.”). 
130 See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting 
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 851 (2006). 
(discussing concerns that controlling shareholders without a commensurate 
economic stake in the corporation are more likely to “tunnel” away a 
disproportionate share of firm value). 
131 See Hayden & Bodie, False Promise, supra note 61, at 477–99 (cataloguing 
the ways in which shareholder interests diverge); Iman Anabtawi, Some 
Skepticism about Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 577-93 
(2006) (same). 
132 Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 
775, 778–81; see also Hu & Black, supra note 130, at 815.. 
133 See Hayden & Bodie, False Promise, supra note 61, at 477-80. 
134 See id. at 486–88. 
135 See id. at 492–94. 
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may differ as to the best way to achieve that goal.136  Ultimately, 
the notion that shareholders have homogeneous preferences is a 
simplifying assumption that is increasingly under strain.137 
 The lack of shareholder homogeneity carries two 
consequences.  First, the principal arguments for exclusive 
shareholder voting are, to put it charitably, less persuasive than 
once believed.138  Second, the lack of homogeneity puts pressure 
on the way in which the voting mechanism is structured.  Of 
course, all social choice procedures are intended to work with 
diverse preferences.  The entire point of most voting systems or 
other is to take a set of individual preference profiles and aggregate 
them into a group choice (indeed, if preferences were completely 
homogeneous, we could just poll one member of the electorate and 
skip the rest of the process).  We do, however, need to ensure that 
the voting structure doesn’t skew in any particular direction.    
 In the relatively simplified world of corporate elections, taking 
care of such a problem is not that difficult.  We should not, for 
example, be that concerned about skewing a result toward a 
minority interest—simple majority votes on the largely binary sets 
of alternatives will take care of that.  More worrisome is that a 
tyrannical majority, temporary or otherwise, will exploit a minority 
interest.  Most political democracies attempt to blunt the effects of 
what the founders called “faction” by making a system of 
government less responsive to the electorate and providing 
substantive protections to minorities.139  The same approach is 
taken in corporate law, where there are many layers between 
shareholders and most corporate decisionmaking and various 
protections for minority shareholders.140 
 One thing that’s typically off the table is limiting the voting 
rights of a particular group of voters because of the content of their 
                                                
136 See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the 
Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1217, 1230-32 (2009). 
137.  See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 132, at 778 (“It is simply not true that the 
‘preferences of [shareholders] are likely to be similar if not identical.’” (quoting 
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 113, at 405)).  See also Hayden & Bodie, 
False Promise, supra note 61, at 477-99; see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, 
Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, 
Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1052 (1996) (“For fictional shareholders, 
whatever else the people behind them may want, all want to maximize the value 
of their shares.”). 
138 Hayden & Bodie, False Promise, supra note 61, at 499-504. 
139 In the United States, this meant, among other things, dividing the government 
into three branches with checks on each other, dividing the federal legislature 
into two chambers, and making one of those chambers (the Senate) less 
responsive to the people.  The substantive protections are embodied in the Bill 
of Rights and some of the subsequent amendments to the Constitution. 
140 For a discussion of protections for corporate minority shareholders, see 
Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119 
(2003). 
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preferences.  It is a fundamental principal of democratic fairness 
that people should not be ineligible to vote because of their 
opinions.141  This is also consistent with the demands of standard 
economics that you take preferences as they come.142  People’s 
preferences are supposed to determine market outcomes and be 
reflected in institutional decisionmaking rather than the other way 
around.143  The function of a voting procedure, for political and 
corporate entities, is to aggregate those preferences. 
 
 
III. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE AND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
SHAREHOLDER VOTING 
 
 Critics have assailed the Business Roundtable decision as a 
“troubling” effort aimed at “asserting [the judges’] own naked 
political preferences.”144  The court imposed a far tougher standard 
on the Commission than the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard would seemingly require.145  However, at the root of the 
court’s analysis is a skewed view of the economics underlying the 
proposed Rule 14a-11.  It is the court’s law and economic analysis, 
rather than its application of administrative law, that we intend to 
explore in this article.  The Business Roundtable opinion 
demonstrates both bad empirical analysis of the underlying costs 
and benefits, as well as bad theory about the effect of the rule on 
the company and shareholder behavior.  These two failings are 
discussed in more depth below. 
 
A. Bad Empirics 
 
 According to the D.C. Circuit, the SEC had an obligation to 
“determine the likely economic consequences of Rule 14a-11 and 
to connect those consequences to efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.”146  One of the court’s primary criticisms of the 
SEC’s rulemaking on Rule 14a-11 was its supposed failure to 
                                                
141 U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV, XV, and XIX. 
142See Stephen E. Ellis, Market Hegemony and Economic Theory, 38 PHIL. SOC. 
SCI. 513 (2008).  
143 See id. 
144 Case Comment, supra note 8, at 1095 (saying that the opinion “made 
missteps similar to those for which [it] scolded the SEC,” and called it 
“troubling”); McDonnell, supra note 8 (“This opinion is little more than the 
judges ignoring the proper judicial rule of deference to an agency involved in 
notice-and-comment rulemaking and asserting their own naked political 
preferences. Talk about judicial activism.”). 
145 See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 8 (noting that “the opinion appears to create 
an almost insurmountable barrier for the S.E.C. by requiring that it provide 
empirical support amounting to proof that its rules would be effective”). 
146 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149. 
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demonstrate that the rule was justified by empirical evidence.  
According to the court, the Commission had “not sufficiently 
supported its conclusion” that the new rule would improve 
company performance and shareholder value “[i]n view of the 
admittedly (and at best) ‘mixed’ empirical evidence.”147  
Commentators have pointed out that this view of the evidence flips 
the standard of review on its head, by requiring an agency to 
demonstrate conclusively that its regulation will provide more 
benefits than costs.148  But on a more fundamental level, the court 
misperceives its ability to judge the regulation’s support in the 
empirical literature.   
 According to the court’s analysis, the SEC “relied upon 
insufficient empirical data when it concluded that Rule 14a-11 will 
improve board performance and increase shareholder value by 
facilitating the election of dissident shareholder nominees.”149  
However, the court’s own analysis of the empirical data is 
extremely cursory, particularly in contrast to that of the 
Commission.  In its Final Rule, the SEC spends significant time 
reviewing a variety of empirical studies that have been conducted 
on the issue.150  Indeed, the court itself notes that the Commission 
“acknowledged the numerous studies submitted by commenters 
that reached the opposite result.”151  However, the court itself cites 
to only one of those studies.  It then attacks two of the studies that 
the Commission did rely on.  It again cited to the Commission’s 
own acknowledgment, this time that one of the supporting studies 
has long-term findings that are “difficult to interpret.”152  Other 
than that, the court simply called the two studies “unpersuasive” 
and the overall evidence “(at best) mixed” and concluded that the 
SEC had “not sufficiently supported its conclusion.”153 
 The court’s cursory analysis of the empirical debate fails on 
many levels.  First, it is completely unpersuasive in its attempt to 
show that the empirical literature stacked up in opposition to the 
rule.  The court’s only citation to this opposing literature is to a 
report authored by NERA Economic Consulting, on behalf of the 
Business Roundtable, in support of the Roundtable’s opposition to 
                                                
147 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151. 
148 Case Comment, supra note 8, at 1093-95 (arguing that the court’s opinion 
established “unattainable standards” using arbitrary and capricious levels of 
review); Zaring, supra note 49 (calling the court’s analysis “the kind of 
searching inquiry no agency could survive”). 
149 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150. 
150 Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56760-64. 
151 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150. 
152 Id. at 1151 (citing Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56760 n.911). 
153 Id. 
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the Rule.154  It is a commissioned document—akin to a legal 
brief—submitted to the SEC in support of the Roundtable’s 
comments.  The court’s sole piece of evidence taken from this 
commissioned report is the following claim: “One commenter, for 
example, submitted an empirical study showing that ‘when 
dissident directors win board seats, those firms underperform peers 
by 19 to 40% over the two years following the proxy contest.’”155   
 The court misstates the evidence.  Buckberg and Macey, the 
authors of the purported “empirical study,” did not submit an 
empirical study of their own.  Instead, they simply summarized the 
results of three other studies.156  All the data from the three studies 
comes from proxy contests that occurred prior to 1990.157  The 
market’s perspective on proxy activity has changed significantly 
over time, and data from the 1960s and 1970s may well not be 
representative of activity twenty-five, thirty, or forty years later.158  
Second, these studies vary in terms of their empirical results.  
Ikenberry and Lakonishok do find significant negative returns at 
24 months when dissidents are successful; however, the negative 
results are strongest when dissidents capture a majority of the 
                                                
154 Elaine Buckberg & Jonathan Macey, Report on Effects of Proposed SEC Rule 
14a-11 on Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Capital Formation in Support of 
Comments by Business Roundtable, (Aug. 17, 2009),  
http://www.nera.com/upload/Buckberg_Macey_Report_FINAL.pdf.   
155 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151 (citing Buckberg & Macey, supra note 
153, at 9). 
156 See Buckberg & Macey, supra note 154, at 9 (citing Lisa F. Borstadt & 
Thomas J. Zwirlein, The Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy Contests: An 
Empirical Analysis of Post-Contest Control Changes and Firm Performance, 
FIN. MGMT., Fall 1992; David Ikenberry & Josef Lakonishok, Corporate 
Governance through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66 J. BUS. 
405, 420 (1993); and Michael Fleming, New Evidence on the Effectiveness of the 
Proxy Mechanism, (Federal Reserve Bank of New York Research Paper No. 
9503), (Mar. 1995), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/research_papers/9503.pdf).  
As Steven Davidoff has pointed out: “Ms. Buckberg and Mr. Macey merely 
state in their letter that they are summarizing the aggregate results of three other 
studies from the early 1990s that examine companies from the 1960s to 1988.  
In this light, it is hard to see what the D.C. Circuit’s complaint is since it does 
not appear that the judges even looked at these underlying studies to assess their 
relevance.”  Davidoff, supra note 8. 
157 See Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 156, at 24 (proxy contests from 1962 
through 1986); Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 156, at 408 (contests 
between 1968 and 1988); Fleming, supra note 156, at 4 (contests from 1977 
through 1988). 
158 Cf. Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 342, 342 (2005) (“The revolution in corporate law has been so thorough 
and profound that those working in the field today would have considerable 
difficulty recognizing what it was twenty-five to thirty years ago.”). 
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board, 159 which cannot happen through Rule 14a-11.160  Borstadt 
and Zwirlein, in contrast, find a 28% drop in cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) for dissident victories, but the statistical 
significance is low, given the relatively small sample size.161  In 
addition, the 24-month point is the nadir; the CAR result improves 
to -16% at 36 months.  Fleming’s results are significantly more 
negative if the dissidents are appointed to their board seats (-
24.72%) than if the dissidents are elected to their seats (-
13.95%).162  Fleming also notes that “the removal of a few 
observations would be enough to eliminate the statistical 
significance in the observed decline.”163  Finally, all three studies 
do not see their empirical results as conclusive evidence that proxy 
contests destroy firm value.  Ikenberry and Lakonishok note that 
proxy contests follow a period of deteriorating firm value: the five-
year growth in these firms’ operating income is 75% below that of 
the control firms.164  They find the post-proxy results to be 
“unexpected and puzzling,” and note that the evidence “suggests 
that shareholders are not rational when they cast their proxies.”165  
In the alternative, Ikenberry and Lakonishok hypothesize that 
proxy contests may create overoptimism by investors and analysts, 
leading to disappointing returns.166  If the firm is worse off than 
expected, dissidents may not be able to solve the firm’s significant 
problems.  This theory is seconded by Borstadt and Zwirlein, who 
suggest that “[i]t may be that dissidents are more likely to win 
control of firms that are in very bad operating shape,” and that 
after they succeed at the ballot box, dissidents may be “little hope 
of saving an already sinking ship.”167  Moreover, these results do 
not keep Borstadt and Zwirlein being overall sanguine about proxy 
contests; they found “positive and significant abnormal returns 
realized over the proxy contest period for firms that were not later 
taken over.”168 These abnormal gains were not lost in the post-
contest period.169 
                                                
159 Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 156, at 421 (cumulative abnormal return 
of -28.6% when dissidents gain at least one seat, versus -41.6% when dissidents 
gain control). 
160 Rule 14a-11 (limiting the percentage of seats to 25 percent of the seats up for 
election, and requiring nominating shareholders to disclaim any interest in 
capturing control). 
161 Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 156, at 29 (“Although the magnitude of the 
CAR is large at the annual intervals, the statistical significance is low.”). 
162 Fleming, supra note 142, at 17. 
163 Id. at 18. 
164 Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 156, at 432. 
165 Id. at 433. 
166 Id. at 433. 
167 Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 156, at 30.   
168 Id. at 31.  In fact, the Borstadt and Zwirlein article is cited in a number of 
articles as evidence for the positive effects of proxy contests.  See Lucian 
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 The foregoing discussion is meant to demonstrate the 
complexities in using this group of empirical studies to enjoin the 
SEC’s proxy-access rule.  There are questions as to the sample size 
of dissident victories; issues of the relevance of proxy battles from 
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s; and disagreement as to the meaning 
of the results that were found.  And these are the studies that 
Buckberg and Macey relied upon in making the case against proxy 
access’s positive impact on firm performance.  Other studies, 
published in a prestigious peer-review financial journal, have 
found that proxy contests increase firm value.170  And regardless of 
                                                                                                         
Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 712 & n. 
68 (2007) (citing Borstadt and Zwirlein for the proposition that “empirical 
studies consistently found that proxy fights are associated with accompanying 
increase in shareholder wealth”); Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making 
Institutional Activism a Valuable Mechanism for Corporate Governance, 18 
YALE J. ON REG. 174, 182 & n.20 (2001) (citing Borstadt and Zwirlein for the 
proposition that “proxy fights are not typically waged over marginal matters, 
and the empirical literature has consistently identified significant positive wealth 
effects from this activity”). 
169 Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 156, at 31.  Fleming similarly found that the 
threat of a proxy contest was associated with significant increases in firm value 
when the .  Fleming, supra note 156, at 10-11 & tbl.4. 
170 Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance of 
Publicly Held Corporations, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 29, 30 (1989); Peter Dodd & 
Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J. 
FIN. ECON. 401, 402 (1983); J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy 
Contests and Corporate Change: Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. 
FIN. ECON. 279, 280 (1998). 
Neither the SEC nor the Business Roundtable court discussed a set of 
empirical studies designed to test whether the market thought that the SEC’s 
proposal was a good idea.  Two studies found that markets reacted negatively to 
the proposal.  See Ali C. Akyol et al., Shareholders in the Boardroom: Wealth 
Effects of the SEC’s Proposal to Facilitate Nominations, 46 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1526081; David F. Larcker et al., The Regulation of 
Corporate Governance (May 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://rockcenter.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/The-Regulation-of-
Corporate-Governance_Larcker.pdf.  However, the methodologies of these 
studies have been criticized.  See Fisch, supra note 9, at 477 n.254 (“A 
combination of problematic coding decisions and confounding events raises 
serious doubts about the studies’ empirical claims.”).  In addition, another study 
that came out after the regulation was enacted but before Business Roundtable 
found that firms that would have been most affected by the proxy access rule 
lost shareholder value when the SEC decided to delay implementation of the 
rule.  Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser & Guhan Subramanian, Does Shareholder 
Proxy Access Improve Firm Value?  Evidence from the Business Roundtable 
Challenge, Working Paper, Jan. 19, 2012, at: 
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-052.pdf.  The study was discussed in late 
2010.  Steven M. Davidoff, The Heated Debate over Proxy Access, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK, Nov. 3, 2010,  at: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/the-
heated-debate-over-proxy-access/.  There is a meta-analysis question about these 
studies, even assuming that one or the other side is correct: namely, why should 
we accord special significance to the market’s views at any particular time about 
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how these studies shake out, they are all examining something that, 
while similar, is not identical to what the SEC is proposing in this 
rule.  Any study of shareholder-funded proxy challenges is not 
directly comparable to Rule 14a-11.  So no empirical research of 
those proxy contests can be definitive.  Moreover, studies that go 
beyond proxy contests in the prior century may also be instructive; 
what role should they play?  Proponents of Rule 14a-11 marshaled 
empirical support for increasing shareholder power as a way to 
unlock greater share value.171  This body of empirical research is 
voluminous compared to the proxy contest studies discussed by the 
court, and its findings are arguably more relevant to Rule 14a-11 
than the limited proxy contest research. 
 Respected legal academics have criticized Rule 14a-11 largely 
for its ineffectuality.172  Using empirical evidence about 
participation and share holdings, they have recounted the 
limitations on proxy access through Rule 11—three-percent 
ownership for three years—and noted the shallowness of this pool 
of potential proxy-access users.173  Moreover, the assumptions 
upon which the limitations are based—for example, that longer 
term shareholders have a better sense of the company’s interests 
over time—have themselves been challenged empirically.174  But 
the SEC recognized the limitations of its rule and provided a 
justification for the rule’s particular balancing of competing 
considerations.175   These normative choices are endemic.  For 
example, while the three-year rule may seem arbitrary, so would 
any rule drawing some line based on the length of the holding.  But 
the notion that the 2008 financial crisis was caused in part by 
short-term profit maximization has received enough academic and 
popular support to support policies based on this justification.176   
                                                                                                         
the effects of the rule?  Given the timing of these studies and their focus, we do 
not fault the SEC for failing to consider them.  But see Fisch, supra note 9, at 
477-78 (attributing the failure to consider these studies as a potential 
“sandbagging” by the SEC of its economic analysis). 
171 See Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56,761 n.914. 
172 Fisch, supra note 9, at 482 (finding that the SEC choose to enact a rule with 
“no consequences”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1431-33. 
173 Fisch, supra note 9, at 458-66; Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1420-25. 
174 See Xuemin (Sterling) Yan & Zhe Zhang, Institutional Investors and Equity 
Returns: Are Short-Term Institutions Better Informed?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 893, 
920-22 (2009) (finding that trading activity by short-term institutional investors 
provides a reliable forecast of future returns), cited in Fisch, supra note 9, at 464 
n.183. 
175 Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56,688-93. 
176 See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of Short-Termism, 46 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 627, 629 (2011) (“Among the competing theories on the cause of the 
financial collapse—the over-dependence on derivatives, the overuse of leverage, 
the culture of greed and entitlement in the finance industry, just to name a few—
a focus on the short term is an omnipresent narrative thread.”). 
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 Thus, the fundamental error in the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in 
Business Roundtable is the presumption that the Commission must 
have more than “mixed” empirical research in order to justify its 
rule.177   Without the rule being enacted in a parallel universe to 
our own, there will never be empirical evidence that is more than 
“mixed” on this issue.178 Academics, of course, should delve into 
the weeds to determine whether a particular study chose the proper 
sample size, controlled for the appropriate variables, and reached 
the right conclusions based on the data.  But when academics using 
proper research methods have come to conflicting conclusions 
about empirical results, it is quixotic for agencies and courts to 
endeavor to find one true answer.  The SEC sorted through the 
research to make a case for proxy access while acknowledging the 
limitations of that research.179  The D.C. Circuit, by contrast, found 
the rule “not sufficiently supported” by the empirical data based on 
its own cursory review of a commissioned summary.180  The 
contrast is striking.  The Business Roundtable opinion 
demonstrates not only a failure to analyze the relevant research, 
but also a failure to understand the limits of that research to the 
question at hand. 
 
B. Bad Theory 
 
 The SEC’s justification for Rule 14a-11 is based partially on 
empirics, but mostly on theory.  The empirical case, discussed 
above,181 is that companies do better when shareholders bring 
proxy challenges against underperforming boards.  The theory 
                                                
177 See Davidoff, supra note 8 (“In truth, there is no definitive empirical 
evidence on this issue and it is likely will not be any. The issue of how and when 
director nominations influence boards is probably impossible to empirically 
prove without doubt. But the D.C. Circuit opinion seems to require such 
empirical proof.”). 
178 One professor supported the rule, insomuch as it would provide data going 
forward as to its efficiency.  Eric Talley, Proxy Access Forum, CONGLOMERATE 
BLOG, (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/08/viewed-
through-the-lens-of-editorial-pages-wednesdays-rule-changewas-a-watershed-
event-shareholder-activists-have-been-c.html (“Some rule changes – and 
particularly non-voluntary rule changes such as the new Rule 14a-11 – have the 
potential merit of creating natural experiments that add to the stock of 
information for future researchers, policy makers, regulators and investors. That 
dynamic value may justify their adoption in close cases, even if one’s knee-jerk 
judgment – based exclusively on currently available static information – would 
tilt ambivalently towards preserving the status quo. At the very least, if we’re 
genuinely interested in maximizing ‘long term shareholder value’ (a topic that 
may be ripe for another debate, another time), the benefit of modest regulatory 
experimentation deserves a seat at the prescriptive table.”). 
179 See, e.g., Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56,760 n.911. 
180 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150-51. 
181 See part III.A supra.   
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behind this empirical evidence is that the board (and its appointed 
officers), despite being the elected representatives of the 
shareholders, may in fact act in its own interest. Shareholders 
suffer agency costs from having a group with potentially differing 
concerns make decisions on their behalf.  The ability of 
shareholders to choose their representatives is thus critical in 
mitigating agency costs.182  
 In theory, shareholders would enforce their will on their 
representatives as most electorates do: through elections.  
Shareholders generally vote every year for the entire board.183  If 
the directors were acting out of self-interest or doing a poor job 
running the company, the shareholders could simply elect a 
different set of candidates who would, hopefully, do a better job.  
However, it has proven difficult to turn this relatively 
straightforward theory into reality.  The foundational work of 
modern corporate law established the paradigm of separation of 
ownership from control: namely, the separation of shareholders 
from managers.184  And the basic work of corporate law and 
economics further develops these ideas through the concept of the 
nexus of contracts and the difficulty of agency costs.185  The 
important developments in corporate law theory and practice have 
almost all concerned efforts to resolve this tension between 
shareholder primacy and managerial control.   
  Shareholders face several critical challenges in proposing 
candidates outside of those nominated by the incumbent board.  
First, they face the problem of the commons: any time, money, or 
initiative they expend in improving the company will redound to 
                                                
182 The Delaware Chancery has characterized the right to vote more in terms of 
legitimacy than economic efficiency: 
 
The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning 
upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests. . . . It 
has, for a long time, been conventional to dismiss the 
stockholder vote as a vestige or ritual of little practical 
importance.  . . . [W]hether the vote is seen functionally as an 
unimportant formalism, or as an important tool of discipline, it 
is clear that it is critical to the theory that legitimated the 
exercise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast 
aggregations of property that they do not own. 
 
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
183 Staggered boards are an exception; directors on staggered boards have two- 
or three-year terms, and generally are up for reelection on a rotating basis. 
184 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1932).   
185 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 127.  See also ROBERTA ROMANO, THE 
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW xii (1993) (“Ever since Berle and 
Means, the central issue of corporate law has been how to create a legal 
structure that monitors management.”). 
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the benefit of the whole.  If the shareholder owns 100% of the 
company, she will capture 100% of the fruits of her labor.  
However, if she only owns one percent—a huge sum for most 
public companies—she will carry all the costs but only capture one 
percent of the benefits.  Unless she expects to earn back those 
costs, it is economically irrational for the one-percent shareholder 
to expend any time or money on improving the company, even if 
the overall gains would dwarf the individual costs.186  Second, 
shareholders under the current system face much higher costs in 
nominating candidates than do the incumbent board members.  In 
order to run for a director position, any candidate outside of the 
board’s official proxy process must essentially create her own 
ballots and then provide them to shareholders to use in the voting 
process.  There is no uniform ballot; instead, “outside” candidates 
provide their own proxies and disclose the information required by 
federal securities regulation.  These substantial costs mean that 
most shareholders never nominate candidates, even if those 
candidates would be superior directors.  The math is simple: the 
board gets its proxy ballot paid for by the corporation, but board 
opponents do not.  That is why proxy ballot access for shareholders 
has been on the SEC’s radar screen for most of its existence.  
Proxy access reduces the costs of participation, which makes it 
more likely that shareholders will participate more actively in 
governance.  The theory is fairly straightforward.187 
 How does the Business Roundtable v. SEC opinion refute this 
basic economic theory?  The court made two counterarguments.  
First, it found that the Commission had underappreciated the costs 
that incumbent boards would incur in trying to defeat the 
“dissident” shareholder nominees.  Second, it argued that Rule 
14a-11 would cater to union and state pension funds who would 
                                                
186 To illustrate this: shareholder X owns one percent of Company Y Inc., a 
company worth $100 million.  If X runs for the board of directors and 
implements reforms to the business, Y Inc. will increase in value 20% to $120 
million.  However, X would only capture $200,000 of those gains.  If X’s costs 
to secure the seat are more than $200,000, X will not pursue those reforms, even 
though the company would increase in value by $20 million. 
187 Lee Harris has argued that the results of corporate elections are based not on 
the directors’ ability to enhance shareholder value, but rather on their amount 
they spend on the campaign.  Lee Harris, The Politics of Shareholder Voting, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1761, 1782-87 (2011).  He maintains that true reform would 
require some system of subsidizing campaign expenses for challengers, akin to 
public financing for political elections.  Id. at 1807; see also Lee Harris, 
Shareholder Campaign Funds: A Campaign Subsidy Scheme for Corporate 
Elections, 58 UCLA L. REV. 167 (2010).  In addition, Yair Listokin has found 
an abnormal number of incumbent board victories in his study of close elections, 
suggesting some form of advantage for incumbents.  Yair Listokin, Management 
Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 159 (2008). 
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use the process to badger for reforms unrelated to overall 
shareholder value. 
 Regarding the incumbent board’s campaign costs, the 
Commission recognized that “it can reasonably be expected that 
the boards of some companies likely would oppose the election of 
shareholder nominees.”188  It also cited to commenters who 
suggested that the costs of proxy contests ranged from $800,000 to 
$14 million.189  However, the Commission noted that these costs 
were not required under Rule 14a-11, and that boards might very 
well choose to expend fewer resources.  This contention drew the 
ire of the court, which found that “the Commission’s prediction 
directors might choose not to oppose shareholder nominees had no 
basis beyond mere speculation.”190  The court recognized that, 
under economic theory, a rational board will forgo an expensive 
proxy campaign “if it believes the cost of opposition would exceed 
the cost to the company of the board’s preferred candidate losing 
the election, discounted by the probability of that happening.”191  
However, the court acceded to the logic of the American Bar 
Association Committee of Federal Regulation of Securities, which 
essentially argued that boards will always have a fiduciary duty to 
fiercely oppose shareholder nominees.  How so?  Well, the 
comment argued, if the board determines that the shareholder 
nominee is not as good as their nominee, then the board “will be 
compelled by its fiduciary duty to make an appropriate effort to 
oppose the nominee.”192  But—of course—in every instance, the 
shareholder nominee will be someone who was not chosen by the 
board as its nominee.  So according to the court, the incumbent 
board has a fiduciary duty to campaign vigorously against any and 
all “dissident” nominees, since the incumbent nominees will 
always be better for the corporation. 
 At this point it is helpful to take a step back and remind 
ourselves of the enterprise.  Rule 14a-11 allows shareholders to 
save the costs in buying their own proxy materials by using the 
company’s proxy materials instead.  It thus may facilitate such 
nominees and thereby increase their number.  But Rule 14a-11 
does not change the underlying fact of the elections themselves; 
shareholders have always been free to run proxy contests against 
the board’s nominees, and the board has always been free to use 
the corporate coffers for its campaign—within the limits 
                                                
188 Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56770. 
189 Id.   
190 Bus.  Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150. 
191 Id.   
192 Id. (quoting Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, Comm. on Fed. Regulation of 
Securities, Am. Bar Ass’n, to SEC 35 (Aug. 31, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-456.pdf.  
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proscribed by fiduciary duty.193  To that extent, the Commission is 
correct when it characterizes the costs of campaign as inherent in 
the underlying elections required by state corporate law.194    
 In fact, by making it easier for shareholders to participate in 
elections, Rule 14a-11 may, somewhat counter-intuitively, 
decrease the number of contested elections.  Corporate boards, of 
course, never have to wait for disgruntled shareholders to 
challenge them in an election.  They can, instead, mollify potential 
rivals by being more alert and responsive to shareholder concerns 
that might prompt a fight.  Or boards might opt to include 
shareholder nominees on their own slates.  Making the corporate 
governance system more responsive could very well encourage 
self-interested corporate board member—as it has for generations 
of politicians—to pay a little closer attention to the desires of the 
electorate.  And while there might be dangers to an overresponsive 
system of governance, that really isn’t of any concern here with the 
limitations built into Rule 14a-11 challenges.  
 And even if corporate management ends up having to deal 
with more contested elections under Rule 14a-11, that alone should 
not have troubled the court.  Focusing on the costs of the election 
for the incumbents is like focusing on the costs of political 
campaigns to incumbents in assessing whether we want to 
facilitate challenges to the incumbents.  Electoral campaigns allow 
for competition between rival candidates to choose the best 
possible nominee.  Yes, it would be less costly if we just declared 
the incumbent the winner—but that would defeat the point of 
having an election in the first place. 
 Unlike the Commission,195 the court does not endeavor to take 
into account the overall costs and benefits of the rule.  It instead 
simply claims that the Commission failed to take sufficient account 
of the costs that incumbent boards would incur in fighting for their 
nominees.196  But the court never mentions the much larger 
                                                
193 According to Delaware law, “where reasonable expenditures are in the 
interest of an intelligent exercise of judgment on the part of the stockholders 
upon policies to be pursued, the expenditures are proper; but where the 
expenditures are solely in the personal interest of the directors to maintain 
themselves in office, expenditures made in their campaign for proxies are not 
proper.”  Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 171 A. 226, 228 
(Del. Ch. 1934).  As the court acknowledged in that case, “difficulty is often 
bound to arise when it is sought in such cases as this to draw the line between 
what is proper and what is improper.”  Id.  See also Rosenfeld v. Fairchild 
Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955). 
194 Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56,770.   
195 Final Rule, supra note 4, at 56,754-71.   
196 It is not really clear from the opinion what the court actually wanted from the 
Commission here.  The court “agree[d] with the petitioners that the 
Commission’s prediction directors might choose not to oppose shareholder 
nominees had no basis beyond mere speculation.” Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 
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potential benefits that shareholders would get from having more 
competitive elections.  Shareholders elect directors.  It is the key 
structural element of shareholder primacy, which is the theoretical 
foundation for the law & economics of corporate law.  Yet 
Business Roundtable v. SEC treats a contested election as a cost to 
be borne by the incumbent board, rather than a critical component 
of corporate governance. 
 Let us say it again—shareholder elections have been a 
cornerstone not only of corporate law doctrine, but in fact of the 
law and economics perspective on corporate law.  In order for the 
board to align its interests with those of the shareholders, the 
electoral process needs to work.  Shareholder preferences need to 
be meaningfully reflected in electoral outcomes.  Law and 
economics scholars have worked at designing ways for 
shareholders to have a stronger voice in the process in order to 
facilitate shareholder wealth maximization.  The need for the 
incumbent board to protect itself against shareholder insurgents has 
never been high on the agenda.  The fact that an incumbent board 
can reimburse itself at all for its campaign expenses is a somewhat 
controversial one.197  Rather than noting that Rule 14a-11 would 
reduce costs for shareholders in exercising their right to nominate 
candidates, the Business Roundtable court emphasizes the costs 
boards will have to expend in fighting them off. 
 Why does the court reject basic economic theory in favor of 
supporting incumbent boards?  Perhaps because the court is 
predisposed to think that the shareholder nominees who will take 
advantage of Rule 14a-11 deserve to be defeated.  In our view, the 
crux of the court’s opinion is its section on “Shareholders with 
Special Interests”—namely, “unions and state and local 
governments whose interests in jobs may well be greater than their 
interests in share value.”198  Because of their “special” interests, 
the court fears that such shareholders will use Rule 14a-11 to 
“pursue self-interested objectives rather than the goal of 
maximizing shareholder value, and will likely cause companies to 
incur costs even when their nominee is unlikely to be elected.”199  
                                                                                                         
1150.  However, the Commission suggested this was a mitigating possibility; it 
did not suggest that incumbent boards would forego proxy campaigns.  Instead, 
the Commission only argued that the costs might be limited.  Final Rule, supra 
note 4, at 56,770.  Although the court cited the petitioners’ claim that the failure 
to estimate the exact costs of such campaigns was arbitrary, the court did not 
specifically endorse this claim.  Bus.  Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150. 
197 See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND 
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 182 (2003) (“. . .[A]uthorizing 
the board to expend corporate funds on its own re-election seems to permit a 
kind of self-dealing.”).  
198 Bus.  Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151-52. 
199 Id. at 1152. 
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The court accused the Commission of acting arbitrarily by 
“ducking serious evaluation of the costs that could be imposed . . . 
by shareholders representing special interests.”200 
 For a court that had earlier been so concerned with empirical 
support, the claim that union and pension fund shareholders will 
use their shares to pursue special interests is laughably lacking.  As 
its authority, the court cites to the comments from the Business 
Roundtable itself, which provides the following quote: “[S]tate 
governments and labor unions . . . often appear to be driven by 
concerns other than a desire to increase the economic performance 
of the companies in which they invest.”201  The quote is taken from 
an article by the Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery.202  
The article does not provide a footnote for this statement, and there 
is no authority presented in support. The claim itself is rather 
couched, qualified by “often” and “appears to be.”  In fact, the 
Chancellor’s entire article is not written as his own views, but 
rather as a missive based upon a fictionalized perspective of an 
“open-minded corporate law ‘traditionalist.’”203  As Chancellor 
Strine emphasizes, “[t]hat viewpoint should not be confused as 
representing my own.”204  Regardless of whether this is meant to 
present an unreliable narrator,205 it certainly makes the article an 
exercise in rhetoric.  It seems fairer to say that Chancellor Strine’s 
statement is something that the “traditionalist” would believe—not 
necessarily something grounded in demonstrated reality.206  The 
use of “appears to be” echoes this notion. 
 The bogeyman of unions and pension funds running amok is 
popular in a certain segment of corporate law literature.207  
                                                
200 Id.  
201 Id. (citing Detailed Comments of Business Roundtable on the Proposed 
Election Contest Rules and the Proposed Amendment to the Shareholder 
Proposal Rules 102 (August 17, 2009), available at 
http://businessroundtable.org/uploads/hearingsletters/downloads/BRT_Commen
t_Letter_to_SEC_on_File_No_S7-10-09.pdf ).  
202 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist 
Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 1759, 1765 (2006).  At the time, Chancellor Strine was a vice-
chancellor. 
203 Id. at 1759. 
204 Id.  
205 See, e.g., AGATHA CHRISTIE, THE MURDER OF ROGER ACKROYD (1926). 
206 See also J. Robert Brown, Shareholder Access and Uneconomic Economic 
Analysis: Business Roundtable v. SEC, DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE, Sept. 30, 
2011, at: http://www.denverlawreview.org/practitioners-
pieces/2011/9/30/shareholder-access-and-uneconomic-economic-analysis-
business.html (noting that Chancellor Strine “was commenting on differences 
among shareholders, not the use of access”). 
207 See, e.g., STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 229 (2008) (“Public employee pension funds are 
vulnerable to being used as a vehicle for advancing political/social goals of the 
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However, it is similarly unsubstantiated there.  The most common 
example of “special” shareholders using their power to affect firm 
governance—in a way that harms other shareholders—is the 
campaign by CalPERS and the United Food and Commercial 
Workers (UFCW) to withhold shareholder support for certain 
Safeway directors.208  The campaign allegedly targeted these 
directors because of Safeway’s hard-line negotiations with the 
UFCW.  In the end, however, only seventeen percent of the shares 
voted against the targeted directors.209   
 The CalPERS-Safeway example has been used over and over 
to demonstrate the potential for unions and pension funds to 
pressure boards into caving to labor demands.210  But the example 
itself demonstrates the lack of such potential.  CalPERS and the 
other pension funds involved had legitimate corporate governance 
concerns to raise along with their union-oriented concerns; they 
did not nakedly assert nonshareholder interests.211  Indeed, why 
                                                                                                         
fund trustees that are unrelated to shareholder interests generally.”); Joseph A. 
Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and 
Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361, 378-83 (2010) (singling out labor unions and public 
pension funds a special-interest shareholders); Romano, supra note 153, at 231-
32 (arguing that union and public pension fund managers use shareholder 
proposals to accrue “private benefits”); Larry Ribstein, The “Shareholder 
Democracy” Scam, IDEOBLOG, (Oct. 27, 2006), at 
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/10/the_shareholder.html (“It should 
be obvious to anybody who cares to look past the rhetoric that the unions are 
seeking bargaining leverage on behalf of their members, and to ensure their own 
survival.  They are not seeking to represent the interests of investors 
generally.”); Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote and Its Political 
Economy, in Delaware and Washington, Working Paper, Nov. 20, 2011, at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884110 (referring to 
“agenda-driven activists, such as CalPERS and other state pension funds, as 
having pernicious and costly side-agendas” apart from those of “financial” 
shareholders). 
208 See Grundfest, supra note 207, at 382-83. 
209 Id. at 383.  Moreover, the directors would have still been reelected, even if a 
majority had voted to withhold their votes. 
210 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 207, at 229; Anabtawi, supra note 117, at 589-90; 
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1285-86 (2008); Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and 
the Separation of Ownership from Control, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 883 
(2010); Grundfest, supra note 207, at 382-83; John F. Olson, Reflections on a 
Visit to Leo Strine’s Peaceable Kingdom, 33 J. CORP. L. 73, 76-77 (2007);  Mark 
J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2524-25 (2005); J.W. 
Verret, Defending against Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware’s Future 
Reviewing Company Defenses in the Era of Dodd-Frank, 36 J. CORP. L. 391, 
397 (2011); David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund 
Activism in Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 
2071 (2010). 
211 Marc Lifsher, CalPERS to Withhold Votes on Safeway CEO, L.A. TIMES, 
April 8, 2004, at: http://articles.latimes.com/2004/apr/08/business/fi-calpers8 
(“CalPERS said it would withhold its votes for Safeway Chairman and Chief 
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would they?—they were also shareholders.  Their exercise of 
power netted only seventeen percent of the total shareholder vote, 
and also led to the ouster of the CalPERS chair who had 
orchestrated the campaign.212  The situation was, in fact, a total 
catastrophe for CalPERS.  It is hardly evidence that unions and 
pension funds will exercise their ballot box power to crush their 
fellow shareholders.  Moreover, beyond this anecdote, the 
evidence is that union and pension fund shareholders have been 
aligned with their fellow shareholders in seeking corporate 
governance reforms.213 
 There’s a reason why “special interest” shareholders have 
supported reforms that support overall shareholder value rather 
than their special interests: they would not otherwise be enacted.  
Efforts by one group of shareholders to elect a director that would 
cater to their unique interests would be met with indifference or 
hostility from their fellow shareholders.  The Business Roundtable 
court fails to explain how union and pension fund shareholders 
could ever use Rule 14a-11 to elect special-interest directors 
without majority support. The numbers do not add up.  There are 
only two alternatives: (1) that shareholders will irrationally vote 
against their interests, or (2) special-interest candidates will 
consistently lose.  The court presents no theory as to an irrational 
                                                                                                         
Executive Steven Burd because of a 60% drop in Safeway's stock since early 
2001 that the pension fund said wiped out $20 billion in market value. CalPERS 
officials also cited what they described as conflicts of interest and a lack of 
responsiveness to shareholder concerns.”). 
212 Tom Petruno, Business Applauds Shake-Up at CalPERS, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 
2004, at A1. 
213 Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: 
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1019-20 (1998) 
(“In most cases, it is hard to find a socialist or proletarian plot in what unions are 
doing with their shares. Rather, labor activism is a model for any large 
institutional investor attempting to maximize return on capital.”).  One empirical 
study has found that AFL-CIO affiliated shareholders are more likely to support 
director nominees by the incumbent board once the AFL-CIO no longer 
represents workers at a given firm.  Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate 
Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders, REV. FIN. STUD. 
(forthcoming), at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1285084. 
Agrawal argues that this divergence represents governance objectives that are 
“motivated by worker interests rather than equity value maximization alone.”  
Id. at 2. The study focused on the split between the AFL-CIO and the Change to 
Win coalition of unions, and examined the behavior of AFL-CIO funds with 
respect to directors at Change to Win companies.  Id. at 3-4, 7-8.  Overall, 
Agrawal found that the AFL-CIO funds voted for director nominees 65% of the 
time and a Change to Win union (the Carpenters) voted 75% of the time, while 
three different index funds supported the director nominees between 89%–98% 
of the time.  Id. at 35 tbl. 1.  Agrawal assumes, however, that the index funds’ 
votes reflect a policy of shareholder wealth maximization.  He does not 
demonstrate why a vote for incumbent directors equals a vote for shareholder 
wealth maximization; it could, in fact, represent the opposite. 
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electorate, but does contend that a corporation may incur costs 
even without shareholder victories.  It raises the specter of a board 
“succumbing to the demands, unrelated to increasing value, of a 
special interest shareholder threatening to nominate a director.”214  
However, it cites no instances of such a power play, nor does it 
explain why in theory a board would cave.  The court also notes 
that special-interest shareholders “will likely cause companies to 
incur costs even when their nominee is unlikely to be elected.”215 
However, the court does not explain why shareholders would send 
up nominees unlikely to be elected, other than to impose costs 
(which is, of course, against all shareholder interests, including 
their own).  Although Rule 14a-11 reduces the costs of nominating 
director candidates, it does not eliminate them entirely, and it 
would be economically irrational for special-interest shareholders 
to incur repeated nomination costs if the result is consistent 
electoral defeat.216 
 Thus, the court’s decision in Business Roundtable rests on 
economic theory that: (a) discounts the importance of the 
shareholder vote in corporate governance; (b) looks only at the 
campaign costs to incumbents when calculating the overall 
                                                
214 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152. 
215 Id.   
216 Joseph Grundfest has provided a theory (unmentioned by the court) arguing 
that union and pension fund shareholders could use Rule 14a-11 as a 
“megaphone” to get across their message and, in some cases, secure concessions 
from sensitive boards.  Grundfest, supra note 207, at 378-83.  Grundfest asserts 
that these shareholders can use the nomination process to gain additional 
publicity “at very little cost” and “need not even come close to winning.”  Id. at 
379.  He cites to the “significant press coverage” that the first proxy access 
candidates will get, or that will accrue to those candidates touting “controversial 
or novel proposals.”  We think that this concern is overstated and, at best, short-
term. It would eventually be self-defeating.  However, it is instructive (and 
perhaps eye-opening) to see the parade of horribles that Grundfest trots out: 
 
Consider a board candidate who wants to limit the export of 
jobs to foreign factories, or to close down foreign factories in 
order to bring manufacturing jobs back to America. Consider a 
candidate who wants to cap all executive salaries at a multiple 
of the average hourly wage of the rank and file. Consider a 
candidate who wants the company voluntarily to comply with 
emissions standards that reduce global warming but that place 
the corporation at a competitive disadvantage in the 
marketplace. 
 
Id. at 381.  Grundfest also alludes to the possibility that “eggshell directors” will 
collapse under the pressure of a dissident campaign and offer meaningful 
concessions to make the campaign go away.  Id. at 382-83.  His only example is 
Safeway—a failure—and his theory requires that directors will act irrationally to 
stave off some level of PR discomfort.  Perhaps such eggshells should not be on 
the board to begin with. 
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efficiency of the shareholder franchise; (c) assumes directors will 
act irrationally in the face of challenges; and (d) assumes “special-
interest” shareholders will irrationally waste their own and the 
corporation’s money in pursuit of fruitless campaigns.  This 
collection of theories departs dramatically from the standard law 
and economics of corporate law, which assumes that shareholders 
and directors will act rationally, that agency costs are a natural 
byproduct of the separation of ownership and control, and that the 
shareholder franchise will increase overall efficiency.217  Why does 
the Business Roundtable court—a court that ostensibly seeks to 
vindicate law and economics principles in its decision—depart so 
dramatically from law and economics foundations?  The next 
section offers our theory. 
 
 
IV.  Business Roundtable and the Purpose of Democracy 
 
 Business Roundtable reveals just how far a sect of law and 
economics adherents has drifted from its own basic precepts.  They 
actually distrust a more robust corporate democracy because the 
electoral outcomes are more likely to reflect underlying 
shareholder preferences.  In a world of stifled democracy, 
theoreticians can make judgments about what the People would 
“really” want if they were freely able to express those preferences.  
So it was with the law and economics of corporate law: the “nexus 
of contract” theory was used to justify the existence of certain 
contractual features in the corporate landscape, while the 
“hypothetical contract” was used to justify the mandatory, non-
contractual foundations.218  Similarly, the notion of “shareholder 
homogeneity” enabled corporate law theorists to speak broadly 
about what shareholders (as a whole) would want.219  If all 
shareholders are the same—or, at least, want the same things out of 
their shares—then the vote itself becomes almost secondary. 
                                                
217 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 113, at 66-72 (defending the 
shareholder franchise); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 102, at 441 (finding 
that “as a consequence of both logic and experience, there is convergence on a 
consensus that the best means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social 
welfare) is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder 
interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those interests”). 
218 See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the 
Unraveling of “Nexus of Contract” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1131-32 
(2011) (reviewing LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 
(2010)).  
219 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 113, at 70 (emphasizing that 
shareholders are likely to have “similar if not identical” interests because “the 
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 As has become increasingly clear, however, shareholders are 
not homogenous.220  A variety of different shareholder “types”—
majority shareholders, shareholders with disproportionate voting 
rights, members of voting trusts, bribed shareholders, hedged 
shareholders, government shareholders, employee and 
management shareholders—have unique interests apart from their 
shareholder compadres.221  Moreover, shareholders differ with 
respect to their definition of wealth maximization.  A hedge fund 
looking for a quick return is different than an index fund looking to 
stay in the stock as long as it is listed.  A shareholder seeking to 
maximize the value of this individual stock is different than a 
portfolio investor.222  Shareholders might have conflicting opinions 
as to business and strategic decisions that shape the corporation’s 
present and future.223  And the notion that shareholders have a 
shared interest in wealth maximization is a simplifying 
assumption.  Shareholders are heterogeneous with respect to their 
utility preferences in that these preferences do not match up 
directly with wealth.  Shareholders – when assessed as individual 
people – all have individual utility preferences that go beyond 
maximization of one’s wealth.224  
 When scholars hold forth that special interest shareholders 
may advance goals that are unrelated to “shareholder interests 
generally,” they put the cart before the horse.  The concept itself—
“shareholder interests generally”—has no meaning until the 
preferences of actual shareholders are aggregated through some 
electoral process.  It’s a mistake to think that any one version of 
shareholder wealth maximization has priority over all the others.  
It’s a bigger mistake for a court to adopt that singular version and 
enforce it.  And it’s simply bad economics to ignore large swaths 
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of individual preferences when they don’t comply with a particular 
vision of the corporation.  Standard economics instructs us to take 
preferences as they come.  In almost every other situation, law and 
economics scholars positively fetishize individual preferences; 
here, they run away from them.  Simple reflection should reveal 
that, when it comes down to it, there aren’t any shareholders who 
seek to advance “shareholder interests generally.”  That, after all, 
is the board’s job, and the way to keep it on task is to ensure that 
the election process is at least somewhat responsive to actual 
shareholders. 
 Of course, if there is no avenue for expressing these diverse 
preferences, there is no evidence of them on display.  In closely-
held corporations, shareholders’ preferences conflict on a variety 
of levels: dividends, mergers, director seats, employment positions, 
and business plans.  And these preferences play out in shareholder 
votes and board meetings.  But the separation of ownership from 
control in public corporations has meant that the shareholder 
franchise is effectively irrelevant.225  If shareholders cannot 
efficiently mount opposition campaigns for director positions, 
these elections become exercises in rubber stamping.  Rule 14a-11 
was an attempt to break out of this dysfunctional pattern.  It 
endeavored to reduce the costs of competing for directorships, and 
thereby encourage more candidates to enter the race.  
 We know from our basic review of preference aggregation that 
there are many ways in which a voting system can fall short of its 
goal of producing outcomes that meaningfully reflect the desires of 
relevant constituents.226  Sometimes there are barriers, both subtle 
and obvious, that prevent interested parties from voting.  
Sometimes the system assigns weight to votes in a way that skews 
outcomes in a particular direction.  Sometimes votes are combined 
in ways that thwart the ability of certain groups of voters to have 
an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice.  And, 
in some cases, voters are hindered in their ability to get their 
preferred candidates on the ballot during the slating process.  A 
defect in any aspect of a voting system has the ability to distort the 
preference aggregating function of an election. 
 Here, even if contemporary corporate governance gets some 
things right (perhaps, for example, “one share, one vote” properly 
captures both the identity and proper weighting of corporate votes), 
it may still fall short when it comes to the slating process.  A 
slating process that unduly restricts the ability of candidates to 
make it onto a ballot is, generally, a problem.227  And when one of 
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the principal justifications for that restriction is based on the 
content of voter preferences, as it is in the case of “special interest” 
shareholders, we can be certain that the results will be skewed in a 
certain direction, distorting the preference aggregating function of 
the electoral process.  In the political realm, we saw that the 
Supreme Court sometimes viewed political stability in the form of 
preserving the two-party system as an acceptable (though not 
uncontroversial) goal of state ballot access laws.228  But the 
existing scheme of corporate governance—the one that Rule14a-11 
was designed to modify—is nowhere close to suffering from the 
kind of unsteadiness that might justify more restrictive access to 
the corporate ballot.  Indeed, the current system has all the stability 
(and democratic fairness) of a one-party state.  
 Which brings us to a little secret about those law and 
economics adherents who believe in shareholder homogeneity: 
they do not want real shareholder democracy.  Shareholder wealth 
maximization is a fictional placeholder developed to replace the 
actual interests of the shareholders.229  If shareholders truly 
expressed their preferences through their votes, there would be no 
need for the norm of residual maximization.  Instead, the board and 
management would be expected to follow the actual preferences of 
shareholders, rather than simply a presumed wealth maximization 
preference.  Thus, we see the strange cycle that justifies the current 
stasis in shareholder democracy.  Shareholders, we are told, will 
single-mindedly focus on increasing the residual as their sole 
preference for corporate policy.  Because it is in the interests of all 
corporate stakeholders that the residual be maximized, we should 
give power to those who have a single-minded focus on such an 
outcome.230  However, actual shareholders may not all agree on 
one homogenized goal. If let loose to express their actual 
preferences, shareholders might express their preferences for a 
variety of interests beyond shareholder wealth maximization.231  
Because shareholder preferences are irrelevant to shareholder 
primacy, true shareholder democracy is actually a threat to the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm.   
 The Business Roundtable decision neatly illustrates this 
hostility.  In its review of the Commission’s cost-benefit analysis, 
the court agreed that Rule 14a-11 “will mitigate collective action 
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and free rider concerns, which can discourage a shareholder from 
exercising his right to nominate a director in a traditional proxy 
contest, and has the potential of creating the benefit of improved 
shareholder value.”232  But the opinion never returned to these 
notions.  Instead, it turned to the concrete costs of democracy for 
the incumbent board: namely, the costs of engaging in a 
meaningful board election, and the potential for “special” 
shareholders to abuse their right to enter elections.233  From the 
court’s perspective, democracy is a messy, expensive process in 
which outsiders may crash the party and ruin the whole thing.  The 
Commission’s failure to recognize this was, in the court’s view, 
arbitrary and capricious. 
 But, of course, democracy is messy.  Most, if not all, of us 
have been disappointed by its results at various points in our lives.  
Some corporate law scholars have argued that democracy should 
have only a minimal role to play in corporate governance, and that 
directors should have the authority of Platonic guardians over their 
shareholder subjects.234  However, mainstream law and economics 
has long defended the critical role of shareholder democracy 
within the overall framework of corporate governance.235  
Shareholders need to hold directors accountable for failing to 
pursue shareholder interests.  Otherwise, the corporation will be 
riven with agency costs. 
The split between the ideas of shareholder wealth 
maximization and shareholder preference aggregation has led to 
the current split in the law and economics academy.  One side 
maintains its faith that facilitating shareholder democracy will 
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increase corporate efficiency and reduce overall agency costs.236  
The other side now trusts the hypothetical shareholder more than 
actual shareholders when it comes to pursuing shareholder wealth 
maximization.  Private equity funds which seek to buy out 
shareholders at a premium are to be encouraged.  But shareholders 
within the company who want to exercise their democratic 
privileges are simply troublemakers.  The D.C. Circuit has placed 
itself firmly in the second camp—and, we believe, inappropriately 
so. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Corporate law and economics scholarship has become adept at 
containing and eliding certain contradictions as to its basic 
principles.  Corporations are contracts, except when they’re not.237  
Shareholders all have the same interests, except when they 
don’t.238  And shareholder voting maximizes utility, except when it 
doesn’t.239  The analysis in Business Roundtable provides a shoddy 
and simplified reflection of these principles; it should perhaps not 
be surprising that the contradictions therefore appear a bit more 
obvious. 
 It is one thing for scholars to debate contested issues using 
rival theories and indeterminate empirical data.  It is quite another 
for the judiciary to strike down a regulation—one specifically 
endorsed by statute—based on one side’s version of the theory and 
data.  The Business Roundtable decision has ensconced a bad 
version of corporate law and economics into the Federal Reporters.  
And we fear that, unless it is corrected over time, this bad law and 
economics will cow regulatory agencies, particularly the SEC, into 
adhering to a crabbed and inchoate vision of corporate governance.  
Hopefully, criticism of the opinion will demonstrate that the 
court’s errors need not be replicated by others. 
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